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Case: CV-20·13-0002962-C Current judge: Molly J Huskey

Nampa Education Association vs. Nampa School District No 131
Nampa Education Association vs. Nampa School District No 131

Other Claims
Judge

Date
New Case Filed-Other Claims

Molly J Huskey

Filing: A - All initial civil case filings of any type not listed in categories B-H,
or the other A listings below Paid by: Stark, Paul J (attorney for Nampa
Education Association) Receipt number: 0019722 Dated: 3/25/2013
Amount: $96.00 (Credit card) For: Nampa Education Association (plaintiff)

Molly J Huskey

Filing: Technology Cost - CC Paid by: Stark, Paul J (attorney for Nampa
Education Association) Receipt number: 0019722 Dated: 3/25/2013
Amount: $3.00 (Credit card) For: Nampa Education Association (plaintiff)

Molly J Huskey

Petition for Declaratory Judgment

Molly J Huskey

Summons Issued

Molly J Huskey

Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other than the plaintiff or
petitioner Paid by: Yost, William F Ill (attorney for Nampa School District
No 131,) Receipt number: 0025311 Dated: 4/18/2013 Amount: $66.00
(Check) For: Nampa School District No 131, (defendant)

Molly J Huskey

Answer to Petition for Declaratory Judgment

Molly J Huskey

4/22/2013

Order to File Stipulated Trial Dates

Molly J Huskey

5/6/2013

Stipulation Regarding Proposed Trial Date (fax)

Molly J Huskey

5/7/2013

Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 08/15/2013 09:00 AM) #2 Set One-day

Molly J Huskey

Hearing Scheduled (Pre Trial 07/01/2013 08:15 AM) Conference

Molly J Huskey

Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 07/29/2013 01 :30 PM)

Molly J Huskey

5/13/2013

Order Setting Pretrial Conference, Status Conference, and Court Trial

Molly J Huskey

5/28/2013

Stipulation Re: Scheduling or Pre-Trial Dates (Fax)

Molly J Huskey

6/5/2013

Respondents Motion for Summary Judgment (fax

Molly J Huskey

Affidavit of Steve Kipp in support of Motion Sum Judgment (fax

Molly J Huskey

Memorandum in support of Motion for Summary Judgment (fax

Molly J Huskey

Notice Of Hearing 8-1-13 (fax

Molly J Huskey

Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 08/01/2013 09:00 AM) Resp Mo
sum Judgment

Molly J Huskey

Request to Obtain Approval to Video Record, Broadcast or Photograph a
Court Proceeding (fax)

Molly J Huskey

Hearing result for Pre Trial scheduled on 07/01/2013 08:15 AM:
Held Conference

Molly J Huskey

3/25/2013

4/18/2013

7/1/2013

7/5/2013

7/12/2013

Hearing

District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Laura Whiting
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100
pages

Molly J Huskey

Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment

Molly J Huskey

Affidavit of Mandy Simpson in Support of Petitioners Motion for Summary
Judgment

Molly J Huskey

Petitioners Memorandum in Support of Petitioners Motion for Summary
Judgment

Molly J Huskey

Respondent's Reply to Petitioners Motion for Summary Judgment (fax)

Molly J Huskey
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Case: CV-2013-0002962-C Current Judge: Molly J Huskey

Nampa Education Association vs. Nampa School District No 131
Nampa Education Association vs. Nampa School District No 131

Other Claims
Judge

Date
7/17/2013

Petitioner's Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent's Motion for
Summay Judgment (fax)

Molly J Huskey

7/25/2013

Respondents Reply to Petitioners Memorandum in Opposition to
Respondents Motion for Summary Judgment (fax

Molly J Huskey

Petitioners Reply Memorandum in support of Petitioners Motion for
Summary Judgment (fax

Molly J Huskey

7/29/2013

Hearing result for Conference - Status scheduled on 07/29/2013 01 :30 PM: Molly J Huskey
Hearing Vacated

7/30/2013

Petitioners Motion to Shorten Time (fax)

Molly J Huskey

Stipulation Re: Hearing on Petitioner Motion to Shorten Time and Motion
for Summary Judgment (fax)

Molly J Huskey

Notice Of Hearing Re:Petitioners Motion to Shorten Time and Motion for
Summary Judgment (fax) 8/1/2013

Molly J Huskey

Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 08/01/2013 09:00 AM:
Hearing Held - Cross Motions for Summary Judgment (UNDER
ADVISEMENT)

Molly J Huskey

District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Laura Whiting
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100
pages

Molly J Huskey

Hearing result for Court Trial scheduled on 08/15/2013 09:00 AM:
Continued #2 Set One-day

Molly J Huskey

Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 10/21/2013 09:00 AM)

Molly J Huskey

8/16/2013

Order on Summary Judgment

Molly J Huskey

9/11/2013

Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The
Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Eberharter-Maki / Tappen Receipt number:
0055124 Dated: 9/11/2013 Amount: $18.00 (Check)

Molly J Huskey

9/16/2013

Notice Of Service of Respondents First Set of Interrogatories and Requests Molly J Huskey
for Production of Documents to Petitioner (fax)

9/27/2013

Filing: L4 -Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Supreme Court Paid
Molly J Huskey
by: Yost, William F Ill (attorney for Nampa School District No 131,) Receipt
number: 0058411 Dated: 9/27/2013 Amount: $109.00 (Check) For:
Nampa School District No 131, (defendant)

8/1/2013

10/2/2013

10/9/2013

Appealed To The Supreme Court (Respondent Nampa School District

Molly J Hus key

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 58413 Dated 9/27/2013 for 200.00) $200
Court Reporter

Molly J Huskey

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 58414 Dated 9/27/2013 for 100.00) Clerks
Record

Molly J Huskey

Notice of Appeal

Molly J Huskey

Petitioner's Request for Status Conference (Fax)

Molly J Huskey

Notice Of Hearing Re: Petitioner's Request for Status Conference (Fax)

Molly J Huskey

Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 10/15/2013 01: 15 PM) Petnr's Req
for SC

Molly J Huskey

S C - Order Remanding to District Court

Molly J Huskey
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Nampa Education Association vs. Nampa School District No 131

Other cIa·1ms
Date

Judge
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 10/15/2013 01: 15 PM:
Hearing Held Petnr's Req for SC

Molly J Huskey

District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Laura Whiting
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100
pages

Molly J Huskey

Hearing result for Court Trial scheduled on 10/21/2013 09:00 AM:
Hearing Vacated

Molly J Huskey

10/17/2013

Final Judgment

Molly J Huskey

11/1/2013

Amended Notice of Appeal (fax)

Molly J Huskey

10/15/2013
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Paul J. Stark, Esq.
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION
620 North Sixth Street
P.O. Box 2638
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 333-8560
Facsimile: (208) 344-1606
Attorney for Petitioner

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

NAMPA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,

)
)

Petitioner,

)

vs.

Case No.:

C\I \3-

zquz- L

)
)

PETITION FOR DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT

)

NAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 131,

)
)

Respondent.

)

COMES NOW the above-named Petitioner, the NAMPA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION
("NEA"), by and through its counsel of record, Paul J. Stark, General Counsel, Idaho Education
Association, for and as claims against the above-named Respondents PETITIONS AND
ALLEGES as follows:
PARTIES
1.

At all times relevant hereto, the NEA was and is the recognized representative for

the members of the Nampa Education Association ("Teachers").
2.

Respondent Nampa School District No. 131 ("School District") is a corporate and

political body existing and located within the county of Canyon, state of Idaho.

PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT- I
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE
3.

The jurisdiction of this Court over this matter is pursuant to Idaho Code § 1-705.

4.

Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-404. Jurisdiction and

venue are proper in this court pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 5-404, 5-514, 10-1201, et seq., and the
Idaho State Constitution Art. V, 20.

FACTS GIVING RISE TO PETITIONER'S PETITION
5.

In the summer of 2012, the Teachers signed a Standard Teacher Contract on a

form approved by the state superintendent of public instruction for the 2012-2013 school year.
6.

The Standard Teacher Contract established the terms and conditions of the

Teachers' employment for the 2012-2013 school year.
7.

The Standard Teacher Contract form approved by the state superintendent of

public instruction provides:
It is understood and agreed between the parties that this Contract is subject to the
applicable laws of the State of Idaho, the duly adopted rules of the State Board of
Education and the policies of the District which are, by reference, incorporated
herein and made a part of this agreement the same as if fully set forth herein.

8.

The Standard Teacher Contract form approved by the state superintendent of

public instruction also provides:
The terms of this Contract shall be subject to amendment and adjustment to
conform to the terms of either a Master Contract or the compensation established
the Board of Trustees pursuant to Section 33-1274, Idaho Code, as such terms are
applicable for the same school year as this Contract.
9.

On or about the week of December 10, 2012, the School District began a

systematic plan where teachers working for the School District were required to attend
mandatory "emergency" meetings conducted by the teachers' immediate supervisory, often the
teachers' building principal.

PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT - 2

10.

At those meetings, teachers were pressured by the School District to modify the

terms of their Standard Teachers Contract by signing another contract for employment entitled
"Addendum Contract."
11.

The "Addendum Contracts," if signed, were an agreement to take four (4) unpaid

furlough days between January and May, 2013.
12.

The School District required that these "Addendum Contracts" be signed and

returned no later than Monday, December 17, 2012.
13.

On December 14, 2012, the Teachers wrote a letter to the Superintendent of the

School District objecting on the basis that the "Addendum Contracts" violated Idaho Code §33513(1) because the "Addendum Contracts" were not a written contract approved by the state
superintendent of public instruction.
14.

On December 18, 2012, the Teachers again wrote the School District objecting to

the "Addendum Contracts" with the additional basis that the "Addendum Contracts" violated the
Rules of the Idaho State Department of Education (IDAPA 08.02.01.150), which provide:

DEVIATION FROM STANDARD EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT FORM.
The State Superintendent of Public Instruction has approved a standard
employment contract form. Any deviation from this contract form must be
approved by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction and reviewed for
reapproval once every three (3) years. (Section 33-513, Idaho Code)
15.

The School District replied, disputing the Teachers' arguments.

COUNT ONE
Declaratory Judgment
16.

Petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference hereby all the allegations

contained in Paragraphs 1 through 15 of this Petition as if fully set forth herein.
17.

The Standard Teachers Contract constitutes a binding and enforceable contract.

18.

There is an actual controversy involving a genuine dispute between the Teachers

PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT - 3

06

and the School District concerning their respective rights and duties under the Standard Teacher
Contracts entered into for the 2012-2013 school year. Specifically, the parties hereto disagree
concerning the interpretation of the "Addendum Contract" and whether the "Addendum
Contract" is lawful under Idaho law.
19.

Petitioner and Respondent have not sought to have their respective rights and

duties adjudicated or determined in any other legal proceeding and until the aforesaid
controversy is judicially determined as requested herein, none of the parties will be able to
ascertain and act on their said rights and duties.

ATTORNEY FEES
As a result of the Respondent's actions as set forth above, Petitioner has been required to
enlist the services of Paul J. Stark, General Counsel to the Idaho Education Association, to
prosecute this action and has incurred, and will continue to incur, costs and attorney fees for
which it is entitled to a separate award pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117 and Rule 54( e )(1) of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure as well as any other applicable statute or rule or contract between
the parties, in an amount to be determined by the Court, or, if judgment is rendered by default, in
the amount of Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00).

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Petitioner Nampa Education Association prays for judgment against the Respondent, and
each of them, as follows:
1.

On each of the bases set forth herein, this Court enter a declaratory judgment

pursuant to Idaho Code§ 10-1201, et seq. declaring the "Addendum Contracts" to be unlawful
and unenforceable;
2.

For an award of attorney fees and costs;

PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT - 4

3.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable.

DATED this2.~ay of March, 2013.
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION

PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT - 5
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William F. Yost, ISB No. 1242
Yost Law, PLLC
4 Ogden A venue
PO Box 1275
Nampa, Idaho 83653
Telephone: 208-466-9222
Facsimile: 208-466-1981

F I

Attorney for Respondent

A.b:t5

q,M.

APR 18 2013
CANYON COUNTY CLERK
T. CRAWFORD, DltPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
NAMPA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,
Petitioner,
vs.
NAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 131,
Respondent.

)
) Case No. CV 2013-2962-C
)
) ANSWER TO PETITION FOR
) DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
)
)
)
)
)

_______________

COMES NOW the Respondent, NAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 131, by and through
its counsel of record, William F. Yost, of Yost Law, PLLC, and as and for its answer to Petitioner's
Petition on file herein, admits and denies and alleges as follows:
1.

Respondent admits the allegations contained in paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 17.

2.

Respondent denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 1, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14,

15, 18, and 19.

ANSWER TO PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT - 1

3.

In answering paragraph 8, Respondent can neither admit nor deny the allegations

contained in those paragraphs as and for the reason that the documents referred to therein will speak
for and establish the terms and conditions of the contract agreement.
4.

In answering paragraph 16, Respondent answers and incorporates by reference all its

answers to paragraphs 1 through 15, inclusive, of the Petition.
5.

Respondent denies each and every allegation contained m the Petition not

specifically admitted herein.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
By stating certain defenses as "affirmative defenses," Respondent does so for the purpose
of completeness and does not intend to suggest that it has the burden of proof of any such
defense. Furthermore, Respondent has not had the opportunity to conduct discovery in this case
and, by failing to raise an affirmative defense, cross-claim or counterclaim, does not intend to
waive any such defense and/or claim, and Respondent specifically reserves the right to amend its
answer to include additional affirmative defenses and to file any such cross-claim or
counterclaim.

FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
No Cause of Action
Petitioner's Petition fails to state a cause of action against Respondent upon which relief
may be granted.

SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Lack of Standing

To the extent Petitioner lacks standing with respect to any claims, those claims should be
dismissed.

ANSWER TO PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT - 2

THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Compliance with Statutory Requirements

The Petition must fail against Respondent, as Respondent was fulfilling required duties as
provided by law.

FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Mootness

To the extent any claim is moot or not ripe for adjudication, that claim should be dismissed.

FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Failure to Join an Indispensable Party

To the extent Petitioner has failed to join an indispensable party with respect to any claims,
those claims should be dismissed.

SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Estoppel

To the extent Petitioner has been estopped from pleading a claim with respect to any claims,
those claims should be dismissed.

SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Failure of Contract

To the extent there was not a valid contract between Petitioner and Respondent with respect
to any claims, those claims should be dismissed.

EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Failure of Consideration

To the extent there was not sufficient consideration to create a valid contract between
Petitioner and Respondent with respect to any claims, those claims should be dismissed.

ANSWER TO PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT - 3

01.1.

NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Lack of Privity

To the extent no privity of contract exists between Respondent and Petitioner with respect to
any claims, those claims should be dismissed.

TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Illegality

In the alternative, to the extent a contract existed between Petitioner and Respondent, and
that contract was unenforceable due to illegality, with respect to any claims, those claims should be
dismissed.

ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Lack of Capacity

To the extent Petitioner lacks capacity with respect to any claims, those claims should be
dismissed, including, but not limited to, the following averments:
(a)

Petitioner alleges representation of unknown parties;

(b)

Petitioner has no legal existence as Petitioner has no contractual relationship

with Respondent;
(c)

Petitioner has failed to satisfy the statutory requirements of Idaho Code

Section 33-1271, as amended.

TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
No Contract Between Respondent and Individual Teachers

Respondent requested voluntary furlough days from certified staff, and furlough days were
voluntarily contributed by over one-half of the certified staff.

ANSWER TO PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT - 4

REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES
Respondent hereby requests that it be awarded its attorney fees and costs incurred herein
pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 12-117 and 12-121 and Rule 54(e)(l), IRCP.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Having answered, Respondent prays that Petitioner take nothing by its Petition herein, that
the same be dismissed and that Respondent be awarded its attorney fees and costs.
DATED this

J~

~
day of April, 2013.
YOST LAW, PLLC

By:~-~

Attorney for Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this / g:1'i day of April, 2013, I caused to be served by the
method indicated below a true and correct copy of the foregoing document upon:

Paul J. Stark
Idaho Education Association
620 North 6th St
PO Box 2638
Boise, ID 83701

U.S. Mail
_Overnight Mail
_Hand Delivery
x_ Facsimile No. 344-1606

ANSWER TO PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT - 5
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William F. Yost, ISB No. 1242
Yost Law, PLLC
4 Ogden Avenue
PO Box 1275
Nampa, Idaho 83653
Telephone: 208-466-9222
Facsimile: 208-466-198 l

\½ I A,k_E_~.M.
O

Attorney for Respondent

JUN O5 2013
CANYON COUNTY CLERK
T. CRAWFORD, DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
NAMPA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,

)

) Case No. CV 2013-2962-C
Petitioner,
vs.

NAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 131,
Respondent.

)
) RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT
) (I.R.C.P. 56)
)
)
)

------------------~--)

COMES NOW the Respondent, NAi\ifPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 131, by and through
its counsel of record, William F. Yost and Chip Giles, of Yost Law, PLLC, and moves this Court,

pursuant to Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, for a complete summary judgment in
Respondent's favor.
This motion is based upon the documents and pleadings on file in tbis matter, together
with the Affidavit of Steven Kipp in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summa..-y Judgment, and
the Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, all filed contemporaneously
herewith.

RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUbGMENT- 1
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Respectfully submitted tilis 5th day of June) 2013.

YOST LAW, PLLC

By:.

le-:
Chip Giles
Attorney for Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 5th day of June, 2013, I caused 10 be served by foe method

indicated below a true an.d correct copy of the foregoing document upon:

Paul J. Stark
Idaho Education Association
620 North 6th St
POBox2638
Boise, ID 83701

_U.S.Mail

_Overnight Mail
_Hand Deli very
lL Facsimile No. 344*1606

Chip Giles

RBSPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT· 2

00001.s

•

William F. Yost, ISB No. 1242
Chip Giles, ISB No. 9135
YOST LAW, PLLC
4 Ogden Avenue
PO Box 1275
Nampa, Idaho 83653
Telephone: 208-466-9222
Facsimile: 208A66-1981

._..'""._.

,£

Attorneys for Respondent

,.

~•V'L' -1.f

UUL.,l_l

l.:

ILJ..J.i

I A,~_E___.q.M.

o

JUN O5 2013
CANYON COUNTY CLERK
T. CRAWFORD, DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
NAMPA EDUCATION ASSOCLATION,
Petitioner,

)
) Case No. CV 2013-2962-C
)
)

) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF

VS,

) MOTION F'OR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

NAMPASCHOOLDISTR1CTNO. 131,

)
)

Respondem.
__________

)
)

COMES NOW Respondent, NAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 131 ("District"); by its
counsel ofrecord, William F. Yost and Chip Giles, of Yost Law, PLLC, and files this Memorandum
in Support of Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment:
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
1.

On July 1, 2011, Idaho Senate Bill 1108 was enacted by emergency measure as part

of Idaho's Students Come First legislation. The new Bill amended Idaho Code Section 33-1274A

(2) to include the following regarding teacher contract negotiations:
(2)
Should the local education association or the board of
trustees fail to ratify and approve the written agreement as provided for in
this section, lh.e board of trustees shall establish other compensation tenns, as
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUlvf•.MARY- ruDGMENT - 1

00001.6

independently detemrined by the board and not controlied by 1he tenns
which failed ratification, for professional employees as provided in section
33-1274, Idaho Code. Provided however, that such compensation shall
reflect the last best good faith offer proposed by the board during
negotiations.
2.

Section 33-1274A remai..r1ed

effect until November 21, 2012, when Governor

Otter issued a proclamation formally repealing the Students Come First legislation pursuant to the
November 8, 2012 referendum votes on Propositions One, Two and Three.
3.

The pre-referendu.'11 version of Idaho Code Section 33-1274 was in effect in the

Spring and Summer of 2012, when the District began master contract negotiations \vith the Nampa
teachers' union, the Nampa Education Association ("NEA"), to negotiate compensation and
economic benefits for teachers.
4.

An agreement regarding compensation and economic benefits was never reached,

and a master contract between the District and the Union was never formalized. Under the thenexisting version ofidaho Code 33-1274, the District's last best offer \Vas imposed.
5.

Teachers were required to sign individual standard contracts with the District

establishit1g the District's last best offer as the teacher compensation and economic benefits for the
2012-2013 school year.
6.

In the Fall of 2012, a :financial audit revealed a $4.3 rr.iillion deficit in the District

7.

Due to the budget deficit, the District was forced to make drastic cost cutting

budget.

measures in.eluding the closure of one school. The District Board of Trustees and administrators
began exploring additional options to keep th.e District solvent.
8.

In order to make payroll and keep facilities open, the District refmanced certain

school bonds, ran a supplemental school levy which was approved by voters, obtained judicial
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approval to enable borrmving, contracted with private vendors to provide school maintenance, and
approached teachers with the option of volunteering for up to four furlough days.
9.

In early December 2012, the District presented teachers with a volunta..ry agreement

in the fonn attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and by this reference incorporated herein ("Addendum
Contract").

10.

The Addendum Contract provided teachers the voluntary option of taking furlough

days to assist the District in managing cash flow and meeting financial obligations. The Addendum
Contract defined all furlough days as voluntary.
11.

Teachers were presented the option of taking any or all of four (4) voluntary

furlough days on the following dates: January 4) 2013; March 8, 2013; March 22, 2013~ and May
31, 2013. The proposed dates were teacher work days, or other non-student days, and therefore had
no impact on student-teacher cont.<tet days.
12.

Teachers were allowed to choose any or all proposed furlough days by circling the

dates they desired on the Addendum Contract.
13.

In early December 2012, District administration conducted meetings with teachers

regarding the District's financial issues and to present teachers with the voluntary Addendum
Contract.
14.

As a result of the meetings with teachers and adrr,jnistration, 545 staff members (501

certified teachers and 44 administrative staff) volunteered one or more furlough days. After the

meetings, 24 certified teachers later modified their agreements adding to, or reducing, the number of
volunteered furlough days.
15.

On December 14, 2012, and again on December 18, 2012, General Counsel for the

NEA wrote to Superintendent Thomas Michaelson, claiming the voluntary Addendrnn Contracts
were illegal and unenforceable.
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On December 18, 2012 Counsel for the District sent a letter to the NEA regarding

the Addendum Contracts. It was explained that if immediate measures were not taken to address the
District's financial issues, t,.1-ie District would be faced with the inability to pay personnel, vendors,
and other contract services, perhaps as early as April 2013. In conclusion the letter requested
leadership, guidance and cooperation from the NEA to address the DistJ.ict's budget deficit.
17.

On March 25, 2013 the NEA filed a Petition for Declaratory Judgment ii.1. the Third

Judicial District, Canyon County, Idaho.
18.

The NEA alleges that its members were coerced into signing the Addendum

Contract and that the Addendum Contract violated Idaho Code Section 33-513(1), because it was
not a written contract approved by the State Superi.ntendent of Public Instruction.
19.

The NEA requested a declaratory judgment pursuant to Idaho Code§ 10-1201, et

seq., declaring the Addendum Contracts to be unlawful and unenforceable.
20.

The District now moves for summary judgment on all issues raised in the Petition.

STAA'DARD OF REVIEW
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provide that sum...-rnary judgment is proper "if the
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c).

In order to defeat a Motion for Summary Judgment, a party must prove a specific and
sufficient issue as to a material fact The Idaho Supreme Court has ruled: "A mere scintilla of
evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts" is not sufficient to create a genuine issue for
purposes of smnmary judgment. Harpole v. Stare, 131 Idaho 437,439,958 P.2d 594,596 (1998).

The non-moving party "must respond to the summary judgment motion with specific facts
showing there is a genuine issue for trial." Turtle v. Sudenga Indus., Inc., 125 Idaho 145, 150,
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868 P.2d 473, 478 (1994). "The non-moving party must submit more tha..ti. just conclusory
assertions that an issue of material fact exjsts to establish a genuine issue." Coghlan v. Beta

Theta Pi .Fraternity, 133 Idaho 401, 987 P.2d 313, 304 (1999). ''Smru:nary judgment is
appropriate where the non-moving party bearing the burden of proof fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element the center for that patty's case." Carnell v.

Barker Management Incorporated, 137 Idaho 322,327, 48 P.3d 651, 656 (2002). Thus, absent a
non-moving party's presentation of facts sufficient to prove a genuine trial issue, the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw.

"On Motion for Summary Judgment, the moving party bears the initial burden of proving
the absence ofmate1ial fact issues." Sherer v. Pocatello School Disr. No. 25, 143 Idaho 486,489,

148 P.3d 1232, 1235 (2006). "Only then does the burden shift to the non-rnoving palty to come
forward with sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact." Id at 489-90, 148
P.3d at 1235-36. Additionally: "disputed facts are construed in favor of the non-moving party,
and all reasonable inferences that can be dravm from the record are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party." Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 142 Idaho 790, 793, 134
P .3d 641, 644 (2006). Therefore, the initial burden is on the party seeking summary judgment,
and ultimately disputed facts will be construed in favor of the non-moving party.
Finally, the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provide that when presenting affidavits, they

"shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth facts as would be admissible in evidence,
and shall show affinnatively that the a:..ffiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein."

I.R.C.P. 56(e).

ARGUMENT

A.

RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE PETITIONER
LACKS STANDING.
Idaho Courts have ruled that 'Justiciability is generally divided into subcategories --

MEMORANbUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 5

0

advisory opinions, feigned and collusive cases; standing; ripeness, mootness, political questions; and
administrative questions." Miles v. Idaho Power, 116 Idaho 635, 639 778 P.2d 757, 761 (Idaho
1989). Regarding standing, Ida.li.o Courts have held "it is a fondamental tenet of American
jurisprudence that a person wishing to invoke a court's jurisdiction must have standing." Van

Va/kenburgh v. Citizensfor Term Limits, 135 Idaho 121, 124, 15 P.3d 1129, 1132 (2000). Based
on the facts of tl1is case, it is the District's position that the NEA lacks standing to bring a petition

for Declaratory Judgment.
In 1989, the Idaho Supreme Court applied the following three-factor analysis to detennine

standing in Miles v. Idaho Power Co.:
(1) Standing "focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the
issues the party \Vishes to have adjudicated;" (2) Th.at i,_-,_ order "to

satisfy the case or controversy requirement of standing, litigants
generally must allege or demonstrate an .injury in fact and a
substantial likelihood ihat the judicial relief requested v.rill prevent or
redress the claimed injury;'' and (3) That "a citizen and taxpayer may
not challenge the governmental enactment or the injury as one
separate alleged by all citizens and taxpayers of the ju..risdiction."
Miles v. Idaho Power Co, 116 Idaho 635, 641, 778 P.2d 757, 763 (1989) (citing Valley Forge

Christian College v. Americans United/or Separation o/Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 102
S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982)); see also Boundary Backpackers v. Boundary County, 128
Idaho 371, 375, 913 P.2d 1141, 1145 (1996).
Thus, to satisfy the case or controversy requirement of standing, litigants generally must
allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief
requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury. Miles at 116 Idaho at 641. In Miles, the
Court also found that standing requires a showing of a "distinct palpable injury" and a ''fairly
traceable causal connection between the claim.ed injury and the challenged conduct." Id at 639.
Palpable is defined as follows: "l. Tangible; capable of being touched or felt; 2. Noticeable; easily
perceptible;

and 3. Manifest; easily perceptible by the mind.;' ''Palpable." Merriam-Webster.com
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Merriam-Webster, 2011. Web. 22 May 2013.
The NEA seeks a judgment declaring the Addendum Contracts to be unlawful and
unenforceable. In order to invoke this Court's jurisdiction, the NEA must prove standing, and at a
minimum satisfy the first two applicable prongs of the three part .Miles test. First, the NEA has not
alleged an injury in fact. The NEA cannot prove that the voluntary signing of an agreement resulted
in injury to any NEA member. Therefore, the NEA does not meet the first prong of the Miles test.
Second, assuming existence of an injury, there is no m::elihood the relief requested by the
District would prevent or redress the claimed iajury. The District presented teachers with the
.Addendum Contracts as a one-time measure to address an inu:nediate and substantial budget
concern. A judgment granti..I1g the NEA's request for relief would declare a previously executed and
fully performed contract is (or was), unlawful and unenforceable. This does nothing to prevent or
redress any Lajury, actual or alleged. Tims; the NEA fails under the second prong of the Miles test.
The process surrounding the Addendum Contracts was completely voluntary. It is
impossible that a distinct and palpable injury could stem from a voluntary act. Since the NEA
cannot articulate a distinct and palpable injm-y, there is no traceable causal connection to the alleged
conduct. Thus; in addition to failing the Miles test, the NEA fails to prove standing under the
distinct, palpable and directly traceable analysis set forth by Idaho Courts.
A recent discussion of the standing doctri.rie occurred in the case; In re: Jerome Board of

Commissioners. TI1e ColLrt applied an associational standing analysis in addition to the Miles test.
Citing the decision in Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass 'n, Inc. v. State ex rel. Andrus, the Court found, "as
applied to associations seeking standing for its members, this Court considers whether the

association has alleged that at least one of its members face inju.ry and could meet foe requirements
of standing on an individual basis." In re Jerome County Bd ofCom'rs; 153 Idaho 298,281 P.3d
1076, 1082 (2012).
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In re.· Jerome County concerned the approval of a pennit for a Concentrated Animal

Feeding Operation ("CA.PO") by the Jerome County Board of County Commissioners ("Board;').
Several individuals and organizations were opposed to the CAFO because of potential harms to
neighboring farms and the Minidoka Historic Site. Several of these groups petitioned the District
Court for review of the Board's decision. The District Court affirmed the Board'·s approval of the

permit, ruling that four of the organizations concerned with the effects of the CAFO on the
Minidoka National Historic Site lacked standing. Several of the objecting parties appealed the
District Court decision, and asked the Idaho Supreme Court to find that the parties had standing to

challenge the pem1it approval.
On appeal, the Supreme Court found that every group but one had standing to appeal the
Board's decision. The CotLrt: mled that groups with members whose primary residences were within
one mile of the proposed site, or adjacent to the proposed site could be severely affected, and face
potential harm, if the proposed site were developed. Id at I 082. Since the proposed site would
create a redressable injury for at least one member of each group, the coun reasoned that these
groups met the requirements to establish associational standing.
The Court, however, denied standing to a group that "could not provide a specific allegation
that any identified member of t½.e group live in proximity to the proposed CAFO site, or would be
banned by its presence," a.11d "at best voiced concerns on behalf of unidentified members of their

organizations, none of whom individually would have standmg to participate in an appeal." Id at

1088.
It is unlikely any }.rEA member can show they have, or would be hai.-med by, the existence

or the signing of a voluntary furlough agreement. Furthermore, the NEA can..'1ot claim associational
standing since no one member faces injury, or could meet the requirements of standing on an
individual basis. The ~'EA' s failure to satisfy the Miles test, or the Idaho requirements for
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associational standing is fatal to its request for declaratory relief. Therefore, due to lack of standing,

summary judgment should be awarded in favor of the District.
B.

RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE ISSUES
ALLEGED BY THE PETITIONER ARE NOW MOOT.
Idaho Courts have found an issue is moot if it "presents no justiciable controversy and a

judicial detem1ination will have no practical effect upon the outcome." Idaho County Property

Owners Ass'n., Inc. v. Syringa General Hosp. Dist., 119 Idaho 309, 315, 805 P.2d 1233, 1239
(1991). The District's opinion in this case is no justiciable controversy exists, and any argument
raised in relation to the voluntary Addendum Contract is moot. Therefore, any judicial

determination would have no practical effect upon the outcome.
Idaho County Property O,,.mers Ass'r1. involved a request by the Idaho County Property

Owner's Association for an injunction preventing.thee Sytjnga General Hospital District from
expending taxes levied by the District. The Idaho Supreme Court ruled that at the time summary
judgment was heard on the issue, there remained a substantial amount of money in lhe capital
improvement fund, and the inju.11.mion requested would have been effective in preventing the
ha:nn of which the plaintiffs complained. Id at 315. Due to the existence of money in the capital
improvement fund, and the fact that an iajunction would prevent harm to the plaintiffs, the Court
found a justiciable controversy and rnled that the mootness doctrine did not apply.
Idaho Courts have also ruled that an issue will become moot "if it does not present a real
and substantial controversy that is capable of being concluded" by judicial relief. Koch v.
Canyon County, 145 Idaho 158, 163, 177 P.3d 372, 377 (2008). In Koch, the Supreme Court

considered whether a group of Ca.11yon County taxpayers had standing to litigate the
constitutionality of a lease agreement entered into by the County and whether the issue was moot
once the County purchased and later sold the real property previously subject to the lease
agreement. The Court held that since the pre-existing lease agreement was no longer in effect,
MEMORANbUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGWLENT • 9

and on remand to the District Court for further proceedings, the Court could not grant the
plaintiffs any specific relief regarding the lease agreement. The Supreme Court dismissed the
appeal as moot, since no exception to the mootness doctrine applied. id

By the time this motion is argued, performance of Lhe voluntary Addendum Contracts
between teachers and the District will be complete, and no live controversy will exist. Judicial
action declaring the Addendun1. C()ntracts unlawful and unenforceable will do nothing to prevent

any ham1 complained of by the NEA. Furthermore, the NEA has failed to establish the existence
of •'a real and substantial controversy, which is capable of being concluded." As a result, any

issue raised by the NEA in relation to the voluntary Addendum Contracts is now moot.
In light of the above analysis, IdElJ10 courts have provided the following exceptions to the
mootness doctrine: "(1) \Vhen there is the possibility of collateral legal consequences imposed on
the person raising the issue; (2) when the challenged conduct is likely to evade judicial review
and thus is capable of repetition; and (3) when an otherwise moot issue raises concerns of
substantial public interest." Ametitel Inns, Inc. v. Greater Boise Auditorium Dist., 141 Idaho 849,

851-52, 119 P.3d 624, 626-27 (2005).
Idaho courts have routinely applied factor one in the criminal context. Generally,
11

collateral legal consequences" have been found to include civil disabilities associated with

criminal convictions, such as being "barred from holding certain offices, voting in state elections,

and serving as ajuror.u State v. Shepperd, 38286 Court of Appeals ofldaho September 15, 2011,
citing United States v. Mercurris, 192 F.3d 290,293 (2d Cir. 1999).
The Supreme Court additionally held "potential relitigation of a...r1 undecided issue is not
the type of collateral consequence contemplated under this exception. In effect, the State is
asking this Court to issue an advisory opinion in order to avoid the issue in future cases; an
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exercise this Court will not undertake." State v. Barclay, 232 P.3d 327, 149 Idaho 6 (Idaho

2010).
If Declaratory relief is not "'~·"""'"' ",.., in this case there will be no future collateral legal
consequences, such as precluding eligibility to hold state office, voting rights, or eligibility to
serve as a juror. Furthennore, a court is not compelled to hear further argument related to a
voluntary Addendum Contract, already executed and performed, because to do so would ask the
court to issue an advisory opinion. Therefore, absent potential collateral legal consequences any
argument raised in relation to the voluntary Addendum Contracts does not invoke facror one of
the mootness analysis. Furthermore, declaratory relief in this case would force the Court to issue
an advisory opinion.
Idaho courts have applied the second exception to the mootness doctrine to criminal
appeals upon completion of a penitentiary sentence. The exception applies to these cases since
ordinarily any issue raised in relation to a prison sentence would be considered moot once the
sentence was served. However, to dismiss such an action as moot would allow a sentencing issue
to evade judicial review, and become capable ofrepetition. See Russell v. Fortri.ey, 722 P.2d 490,

111 Idaho 181 (Idaho App. 1986), }vfalle,y v. Lewis, 678 P.2d 19, 106 Idaho 227 (Idaho 1983).
Additionally, Idaho courts have applied the second exception in the domestic law context,
analyzing a father's right to designate visitation with his child to another family member, while

serving in the military overseas. Even though the father had returned from service, and would
have no need to designate his visitation rights, the court found the issue to fall within the

mootness exception because the father was still eligible for re-deployment as an enlisted member
of the National Guard, and since other enlisted persons could face the same issue regarding
designation of visitation. As a result, the issue regarding designation of visitation rights could

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 11

evade judicial review, and become capable of repetition. See Webb v. Webb, 148 P.3d 1267, 143
Idaho 521,524 (Idaho 2006).
The Idaho Supreme

applied the third "public interest" mootness exception. when

the substantive issue presented was whether public entities could use public funds to campaign in
an election. The Court applied the exception declaring a public entity's use of public funds for
election campaigns "an issue of substa.TJ.tial public interest that this Court has not yet addressed."
The Court employed the exception

heard argument on the issue to "provide guidance and

direction in the future." Ameritel Inns, inc. v. Greater Boise Auditoriwn Dist., 119 P.3d 624, 141
Idaho 849, 852 (Idaho 2005).
Conversely, in Koch (previously cited), the Idaho Supreme Court refused to apply the
public interest exception when the issue presented to the Court was whether a property lease
agreement between Canyon County a..'fld a private entity violated the provisions of Article VIII,
§ 3, of the Idaho Constitution. The Court held that since "the district court has not yet ruled on

whether the particular lease agreement in this case vioiates Article VIII, § 3, rema...11.ding the case
for the district court to ma.lee that determination when it would not resolve any dispute between
the parties and would simply be asking the court to make an advisory opinion." Koch 145 Idaho
158, 160.

The Addendum Contracts at issue in the NEN s complaint differ from appeal of a
criminal sentence already served, and the designation of visitation rights for overseas service
members since the Addendum Contracts were voluntary and will be completely performed by
the time this Motion is argued. Thus, the second mootness exception does not apply.
Additionally, the signing of an agreement to volunteer a furlough day does not trigger a
high degree of public interest, such as the use of public funds for an election campaign. Much

like the lease issue presented in Koch, an adjudication declaring the Addendu.111 Contracts
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 12

unlawful and unenforceable would not resolve any dispute between the parties, and would
request an advisory opinion from the Court. Thus, the public interest exception to the mootness
doctrine does not apply.
Based on the above, any issue raised by Petitioner in relation to the voluntary Addendum
Contract is now moot, and does not fall under any exception to the mootness doctrine. Therefore,
summary judgment should be entered in favor of the District
C.

RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE ISSUES
ALLEGED BY PETITIONER ARE NOT RIPE FOR REVIEW.
Legal claims must be ripe for review in order for justiciability to exist. Tbe ripeness test in

Idaho "asks whether court action is necessmy at the present time." Boundary Backftackers; 128
Idaho 371, 376. Under the three-part ripeness analysis established by Idaho courts, a party must
show the following: (1) The case presents definite and concrete issues; (2) a real and substantial
controversy exists (as opposed to hypothetical facts); and (3) there is a present need for
adjudication. Noh v. Cenarussa, 137 Idaho 798,801, 53 P.3d 1217, 1220 (2002).
Idaho courts have applied the ripeness test to determine justiciability in a variety of cases.
In Boundary County, the Supreme Court analyzed the constiturionality of an ordinance requiring
Boundary County to enforce compliance with a plan proclauni.'1g that no wilderness areas shall

be designated in Boundary Cmmty. The Court found the matter ripe for review since:
The ordinance is in place. It contains several edicts concerning the
compliance of federal and state agencies with the plan and
announces that "[n]o wilderness areas shall be designated in
Boundary County.!! The ordinance proclaims: "Bou.ridary County
shall enforce complia.11ce with [the plan]. ... " The affidavit of the
board members who enacted the ordinance stating that they
"deemed that it would not be proper to seek enforcement of the
ordinance by fines or penalties'' does not override the terms of the
ordinance requiring enforcement. We w:ill not speculate whether
the board members will choose another form of enforcement or
whether a new board will choose to enforce the ordinance by fines
or penalties. The ordinance requires the pla.'1 to be enforced.
Boundary Backpackers, 128 Idaho 371; 376.
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In Boundary, the Court found the matter ripe for review since the issue regarding the present
ordinance was definite and

a substantial controversy regarding enforcement existed, and

there was a present need for adjudication. Id.
In Slate v. Manley, the Idaho Supreme Court found

fUl

issue regarding the double

jeopardy clause ripe for review. The case involved Manley's request for review of a District

Court's declaration of a mistrial, and denial of Manley's Motion to Dismiss with prejudice on the
grounds that any re-trial would be barred by double jeopardy. The State requested dismissal without
prejudice, moving to dismiss the charge against Manley, but preserve the right to re-charge at a later
date. The District Court grar1ted the State's Morion.
The Court of Appeals upheld the District Court decision; and on appeal to the Supreme
Court, the State argued that since Manley was no longer being charged, fae double jeopardy issue
was not ripe for review. Tne Supreme

found, "it is clear that this issue will be before us

either now or in the future, and a declaration now of the various righrs of the pruties will
certainly afford a relief from uncertainty and controversy in the future." State v. Manley, 142

Idaho 338, 342, 127 P.~d 954 (Idaho 2005).

In reaching its decision, the Court found that potential further prosecution of Manley was
a concrete issue, and created a real and substantial controversy. The Court also found a present

need for adjudication because Ma..'lley's double jeopardy rights had been violated. Id. Because

Manley satisfied the three-part ripeness test, the Court found the issue ripe for review.
Unlike the issue presented in Boundary Backpackers, where the constitutionality of an
effective ordinance was in question, the adjudication of a fully executed and performed voluntary
agreement does not present a definite a.rid concrete issue. In fact, arguments raised by the NEA
fail to produce any issue at all, since the voluntary Addendum Contracts were a one-time
measure, employed to address inLmediate and substantial financial concerns. Moreover, since the
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voluntary Addendum Contracts

-
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been folly executed and performed, no definite and

concrete issue exists.
For the reasons mentioned above, the NBA cannot show a real an.d substantial

controversy as required by factor two. There is no controversy with regard to the voluntary
Addendum Contracts since by the time this Motion is heard, the voluntary Addend1.nn Contracts

will have been fully performed. In seeking a declaratory judgment, the NEA's Petition only
presents hypothetical facts, and will ask the Court to make an advisory opinion as to future
adjudication of an executed voluntary agreement.
Factor two distinctly requires a real and substantial comroversy to exist (as opposed to
hypothetical facts). The NEA's request for a declaratory judgment in relation to a fully
perfonned voluntary Addendum Contract compels the Court to consider purely hypothetical
facts. As a result, the NEA fails to meet factor two of the ripeness analysis.
Because the NEA fails to meet the first two prongs of the three-part ripeness test, and
particularly since the voluntary Addendum Connacts have been executed and fully performed,
the Court is not compelled to adjudicate the issue. In contrast to Manley, where a Constitutional
right was at issue, and demanded present adjudication) the issue invoked in the NEA's Petition

was the execution of a volm1tary agreement. This does not give rise to the violation of a
constitutional right. Timsi the NEA fa.ils to meet the third factor of the ripeness analysis since
there is no compelling need for present adjudication.
As a result, court action is not necessary at the present time. Any issue raised by
Petitioner in relation to the voluntary Addendum Contracts fails to meet the requirements for
ripeness. Therefore, summary judgmem should enter in favor of the District.

D.

SINCE THE ISSUE IS NOT JUSTICIABLE AND NO ACTUAL CONTROVERSY
EXISTS, DECLARATORY JUDGMENT IS JMPROPER.
The authority for Idaho courts to render declaratory judgment is provided by statute. The
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Declaratory Judgment Act, contained in Idaho Code Title 10, Chapter 12, provides jurisdiction to
the court to, "declare rights, status,

0th.er legal relations, whether or not further relief is or could

be claimed." LC. § 10-1201.
However, absentjusticiability, Idaho courts may not grant declaratory relief. /.u1 early Idaho
case provided, "a central fouI1dation of the Idaho Declaratory Judgment Act is the requirement of

adverse parties, and there must be a justiciable issue presented." Whitney v. Randall, 58 Idaho
49,59, 70 P.2d 384 (1937).
More recently, the IdaJ10 Supreme Court recognized the limitations on jurisdiction to
provide declaratory reliet rnling that "a declaratory judgment can only be rendered in a case
where an actual or justiciable conrroversy exists." Harris v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513, 516,
681 P.2d 988,991 (1984).
In Harris; the appellants were recipients of county indigency benefits. The Court found
justiciabiliry to exist since appellants did not pose a hypothetical question, and the controversy
related to appellants' claim of right to receive county indigency benefits, even if the fund is
depleted, was definite. concrete and touching the legal relations of the parties. The Court further
found the parties to have adverse legal interests, and existence of a real and subs1antia1
controversy since a claim of right to receive indigency benefits was at issue. Accordingly, the
Court found the dismissal of the District Court's action for declaratory relief improper and
remanded for further consideration. Id.
The Idaho Supreme Court followed established Idaho precedent in Selkirk-Priest Basin

Assoc., Inc. v. State ex rel. Batt, and ruled, "the Declaratory Judgment Act does not relieve a
party from showing that it has standing to bring the action in the firsI instan.ce." Selkirk-Priest

Basin Assoc., Inc. v. State ex rel. Bau, 128 Idaho 831, 834, 919 P.2d 1032, 1035 (1996). In
Selkirk, the Court found that the Selkirk-Priest Basin Association's ("SPBA") right to challenge
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timber sales Vlas directly impacted by existing statutes. However, since the SPBA failed to prove
standing to challenge the timber sale in the first instance, the Court refused to grant the SPBA's

request for declaratory judgment. See Selkirk-Priest Basin, 128 Idaho 831 (1996).
Thus, it is well-established that Idaho Courts do not render declaratory judgment if the
requirements of justiciability are not met. The NEA has failed to present a justiciable issue to the
Court. Unlike Harris, where the Court found a real and substantial controversy, involving

indigent citizen's future claims to the County indigent fund, the NEA seeks declaratory relief in
relation to a fully perfo1med voluntary Addendum Contract. Therefr.)re, unlike Harris, the NEA' s
Petition does not present a real or substrmtial controversy to the Court.
The NEA's Petition compels the Court to consider the Idaho Supreme Comt's holding in
Selkirk, where absent standing, the Court mled declaratory relief was improper. The NEA has
failed to meet the standing requirements to request relief from the Court, just like the petitioners

in Selkirk. As a result, the Court should not gra.rit injunctive relief
The NEA/s failure to prove justiciability, leaves the Court \Vith no basis to grant
Declaratory Judgment. Therefore, smnma.ry judgment should be entered in favor of the District
CONCLUSION Ai°''D REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES

Respondent respectfully requests that this Court grant fae Motion for Summary Judgment
based on the foregoing. Additionally, Respondent hereby requests that it be awarded its attorney
fees and costs incurred herein pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 12-117 and 12-121 and Rule
54(e)(l), IRCP.
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DATED this 5th day of Ju...t1e, 2013.

YOST LAW, PLLC

By:_--=...-Y-_ _ _ _ _ __
Chip Giles
Attorney for Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 5th day of June, 2013, I caused to be served by the method
indicated below a true and correct copy of the foregoing document upon:

Paul J. Stark
Idaho Education Association
620 North 6th St
PO Box2638

_U.S.Mail
Overnight Mail
_Hand Delivezy
JL Facsi~ile No. 344-1606

Boise, ID 83701

Clµp Gjles
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ADDENDUM TO
CONTINUING TEACHER CONTRACT
THIS ADDENDUM TO CONTfrJUlNG TEACHER CONTRACT ("Addendum") is
made this 13 day of De?.
, 201:).... by and betw.een NAMPA SCHOOL
DISTRICT NO. 131, Canyon County, Idaho, State of Idaho {hereinafter called "District") and
..._____ (hereinafter,called "Teacher"), collectively referred to as

RECITALS
A.
District and Teacher entered into a State of Idaho Continuing Teacher Contract
dated the _ _ day of Se11:t:
, 2012, for the school year 2012-2013.

,~

B.

District is experiencing significant budgeting problems and will not be able to

fully fund the cash flow requirements for the balance of the 2012-2013 school year.
C.
Teacher desires to pa."iicipate in a voluntary program to aid District in managing
its necessary cash flow re<Juirements and enable District to meet its required and necessary
obligations.
·
D.

Now, therefore, the parties covenant and agree as follows.

ADDENDUM
L
INCORPORATION OF RECITALS: The above recitals are contractual and
binding and are incorporated herein as if set forth in foll.
2.
FURLOUGH DAYS: Teacher agrees to contribute ont; {l) to four ,(4) furlough
clays to District from the following eligible dares (the selected furlough days shall be circled):
.. ,

A furlough day is defmed as a voluntary act by Teacher iri accepting certain days where Teacher
will not perform his or her customary duties and will receive no compensation for those days. At
the complete discretion of Teacher, he/she may provide services as required under the
Continuing Teacher Contract referred to above in Recital A 1 but as a volunteer only.
3.
BENEFITS: No reduction will be made to any benefits available or accruing for
and on behalf of Teacher.
ADDENDUM TO CONTINUING TEACHER CONTRACT - I

EXHIBIT

.iJ'~ ..

-

('.

(

4.
TERM: This Addendum shall apply only to the remainder of the 2012-2013
school year, and this Addendum shall tenninate upon the termination date of the Continuing
Teacher Contract referred to above in Recital A. .
,,
,
5.
NO OTHER AMENDMENTS: It is agreed by and between the parties that
nothing herein contained shall operate or be construed as a waiver of any of the rights, powers,
privileges, or duties of either party hereto, by and under the laws of the State of Idaho, and as
provided in that Continuing Teacher Contract referred to in Recital A, otherwise than is
expressly stated_in this Add~ndum.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, District has caused this Addendum to be executed in its name
by its proper officials, and Teacher has executed the same all on the date first above written.
NAMPA SCHOOL DISTRlCTNO. 131
Canyon County, Idaho

By:. _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ __
· Chafrman, Board of Trnstees
ATTEST:

Clerk, Board of Trustees

PrintName:

{:·
•.:"~

.

~

. -~
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,

_ _ _ ._.

.._

U..,J..L

-

-

-

-

_....,,, ,' ............ '-<

William F. Yost, ISB No. 1242
Chip Giles, No. 9135
Yost Law, PLLC
4 Ogden Avenue

~ f~ I .A.~. E

PO Box 1275
Nampa, Idaho 83653
Telephone: 208-466-9222

o

Facsimile: 208-466-1981

JUN 05 2013

Attorneys for Respondent

CANYON COUNTY CLERK
T. CRAWFORD, DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTR1CT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
NAMPA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION.

)

. ) Case No. CV 2013-2962-C
Petitioner,
vs.

)
) AFFIDAVIT OF STEVE KIPP IN
) SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR

) SUMMARY JUDGMENT

NAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 13 L

)
)
)
,)

Respondent.
_______________

STATEOFIDAHO )
County of Canyon

: ss.
)

STEVE KIPP, being first duly sworn, on oath. deposes and says:
1.

I was the Human Resource Officer of Nampa School District No. 131 (''District")

at all times material to the Motion for Summary Judgment filed herewith.
2.

As the Human Resource Officer of the District, I was informed regarding the

volW1tary furlough day agreements between the teachers and the District.

AFFIDAVIT OF STEVE KIPP IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGME:r-.'T - l
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3.

I coordinated the presentation process of the agreements from administration to

teachers and personnel.
4.

At the conclusion of meetings between the District administration, teachers and

staff, approximately 545 staff members (approximately 501 certified teachers and approximately
44 administrative staff) volunteered one or more furlough days. After the agreements were

executed, approximately 24 certified: teachers later modified their agreements, either adding to or

reducing the number of volunteer furlough days.
Further the affiant sayeth naught

STEVE KIPP '

,,,1

Subscribed and sworn to before me this go'f-'\day,o(May,
2013.
., _. ' ~.

. ' .

.

commission expires:

AFFIDAVIT OF STEVE KIPP IN SlJPPO:R.T OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 5th day of June, 2013, I caused to be served by the method
indicated below a true and correct copy of the foregoing document upon:

Paul J. Stark
Idaho Education Association

620 North 6th St
POBox2638
Boise, ID 83701

_U.S.Mail
_Overnight Mail
_Hand Delivery

_x_ Facsimile No. 344-1606

Chip G~les
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Paul J. Stark, Esq. - ISB# 5919
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION
620 North Sixth Street
P.O. Box 2638
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 333-8560
Facsimile: (208) 344-1606
Attorney for Petitioner

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

NAMPA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,
Petitioner,
vs.
NAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 131,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.: CV13-2962-C
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Petitioner Nampa Education Association, by and through its attorney of record, Paul J.
Stark, Esq., General Counsel, Idaho Education Association, hereby moves for an Order from tl\is
Court granting summary judgment on its entire Petition for Declaratory Judgment on the grounds
that the "Addendum Contracts" violated Idaho Code §33-513(1) because the "Addendum
Contracts" were not a written contract approved by the state superintendent of public instruction,
and therefore were illegal as a matter oflaw.
Petitioner's Motion is supported by the Affidavit of Mandy Simpson in Support of
Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment, with exhibits attached and Petitioner's
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment.

PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1

000039

<+'-

DATED this~ day of July, 2013.
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION

ey for Plaintiff Nampa Education Association

PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
,..,.,.-fL"-

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the~-- day of July, 2013, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be served
via:
-----

U.S. Mail

- - - - - Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivered
to:
William F. "Bud" Yost
Yost Law, PLLC
4 Ogden Avenue
P.O. Box 1275
Nampa, Idaho 83653
Facsimile: (208) 466-1981

PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3

Paul J. Stark, Esq.- ISB #5919
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION
620 North Sixth Street
P.O. Box 2638
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 333-8560
Facsimile: (208) 344-1606
Attorney for Petitioner

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

NAMPA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,

)
)

Petitioner,

Case No.: CV13-2962-C

)
)

vs.

)
)

NAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 131,

)

PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

)

Respondent.

)

I. INTRODUCTION

Respondent Nampa School District No. 131 ("School District") issued Nampa School
District teachers ("Teachers") illegal addendum contracts in violation of Idaho Code §33-513(1 ).
Due to the fact that the addendum contracts modified the terms and conditions of employment
(as contained in the Standard Teacher Contract) and were not a written contract approved by the
state superintendent of public instruction, such addendums were illegal as a matter of statutory
and regulatory law.
Petitioner Nampa Education Association ("Petitioner") is the duly selected and
recognized representative for the teachers in the School District. As discussed below, Petitioner
PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT- I
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is entitled to summary judgment against the School District because, as a matter of law, the
addendum contracts are unlawful and unenforceable. Further, Petitioner is entitled an award of
attorney's fees and costs, and for such other and further relief as the Court deems just and
equitable.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the summer of 2012, the Teachers signed a Standard Teacher Contract on a form
approved by the state superintendent of public instruction for the 2012-2013 school year.
Affidavit of Mandy Simpson ("Simpson Aff.")

~

5. The Standard Teacher Contract established

the terms and conditions of the Teachers' employment for the 2012-2013 school year.
The Standard Teacher Contract form approved by the state superintendent of public
instruction, and signed by the Teachers, provided:

It is understood and agreed between the parties that this Contract is subject to the
applicable laws of the State of Idaho, the duly adopted rules of the State Board of
Education and the policies of the District which are, by reference, incorporated
herein and made a part of this agreement the same as if fully set forth herein.
Simpson Aff. Exhibit A.
On or about the week of December 10, 2012, the School District began a systematic plan
where Teachers working for the School District were required to attend mandatory "emergency"
meetings conducted by the Teachers' immediate supervisory, often the teachers' building
principal. Simpson Aff.

~

7. At those meetings, teachers were pressured by the School District

to modify the terms of their Standard Teachers Contract by signing another contract for
employment entitled "Addendum Contract." Simpson Aff.

~

10.

The "Addendum Contracts," if signed, were an agreement to take four (4) unpaid
furlough days between January and May, 2013. Simpson Aff. Exhibit B.

The School District

required that these addendum contracts be signed and returned no later than Monday, December
PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
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17, 2012. Simpson Aff.

,r 9.

The decision to put forward these addendum contracts, however,

was never actually approved by the Board of Trustees for the School District. Simpson Aff.

,r,r

11-12.
On December 14, 2012, the Teachers wrote a letter to the Superintendent of the School
District objecting on the basis that the addendum contracts violated Idaho Code §33-513(1)
because the addendum contracts were not a written contract approved by the state superintendent
of public instruction. Simpson Aff.

,r 13, Exhibit C.

On December 18, 2012, the Teachers again

wrote the School District objecting to the addendum contracts with the additional basis that the
addendum contracts violated the Rules of the Idaho State Department of Education (IDAP A
08.02.01.150).

Simpson Aff.

,r

15, Exhibit D. The School District, however, continued to

pressure and enforce the addendum contracts in violation of Idaho law.
III. ARGUMENT
A.

The Addendum Contracts Given to Teachers in December 2012 Were Not On a
Form Approved by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction and Therefore
Are, as a Matter of Law, Illegal.
The Addendum contracts that were presented to the Teachers were not on a form

approved by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction as required by statutory law,
administrative rule and Idaho Supreme Court case law. As a result, the Addendum contracts, as
a matter oflaw, are illegal and unenforceable.
Teacher contracts in Idaho are limited.

They are limited to an approved form.

A

teacher's terms and conditions of employment are contained on what is commonly referred to as
the "Standard Teacher Contract." Such "Standard Teacher Contracts" are published annually by
the

Idaho

State

Department

of

Education

011

their

website

at

http://www.sde.idaho.gov/site/educator resources/contracts.htm. The standard contracts include

PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
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contracts for administrators, Category 1, 2, 3 and renewable contract teachers, as well as retired
teachers contracts and supplemental contracts. The Standard Teacher Contract itself contains the
following legend at the bottom of the contract:
This contract form was prepared pursuant to Section 33-513, Idaho Code, and
approved by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, as a contract which
may be used by school districts. Any other form must be approved by the State
Superintendent, and reviewed for reapproval every three years.
Simpson Aff. Exhibit A.
Idaho statutory law, as well as administrative rule, is plain and unambiguous in the
requirement that teachers are employed only on the contracts approved by the state
superintendent of public instruction (i.e., the Standard Teacher Contract). Idaho Code § 33-513
provided, in relevant part, that the board of trustees 1 shall have very limited authority in its
choice of contract for employment of a teacher. In fact, a school district has absolutely no
choice:
The board of trustees of each school district including any specially chartered
district, shall have the following powers and duties:
1. To employ professional personnel, on written contract in a form approved
by the state superintendent of public instruction, conditioned upon a valid
certificate being held by such professional personnel at the time of entering upon
the duties thereunder.
(Emphasis added.) 2 Further, the rules of the Idaho State Board of Education specifically prohibit
any deviation from the form approved by the state superintendent of public instruction. IDAP A
08.02.01 .150 provides:

1 There

is nothing in the published minutes of the School District demonstrating that the Nampa Board of Trustees
voted to authorize the use of the addendum contracts in the first place. Simpson Aff. ,i 12.
2 The phrases "professional personnel" and "professional employee are used interchangeable in the statutes. See
e.g. Idaho Code §33-515(5). "Professional personnel" is not defined, but "professional employee" is defined under

Idaho Code §33-1272(1).

PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
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DEVIATION FROM STANDARD EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT FORM.
The State Superintendent of Public Instruction has approved a standard
employment contract form. Any deviation from this contract form must be
approved bv the State Superintendent of Public Instruction and reviewed for
reapproval once every three (3) years. (Section 33-513, Idaho Code)
IDAPA 08.02.01.150. (Emphasis added.)

Idaho statutory law pertaining to teachers is incorporated in each individual teacher's
Teachers' Standard Contract. Brown v. Caldwell School District No. 132, 127 Idaho 112, 118,
898 P.2d 43, 49 (1995); Robinson v. Joint School District No. 150, 100 Idaho 263,265, 596 P.2d
436,438 (1979). The Court, in interpreting a similar education code provision, has also held that
the word "shall" is imperative or mandatory, Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 848, 908 P.2d 143,
150 (1995). Properly promulgated administrative rules and regulations have the force and effect
of law. Higginson v. Westergard, 100 Idaho 687,690,604 P.2d 51, 54 (1979), cited in Mead v.
Arnell, 117 Idaho 660,665, 791 P.2d 410,415 (1990).

Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give effect to
the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction. State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho
654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999); State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 65, 67
(Ct.App.2000). The language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, and rational
meaning. Burnight, 132 Idaho at 659, 978 P.2d at 219. If the language is clear and unambiguous,
there is no occasion for the court to resort to legislative history or rules of statutory
interpretation. Escobar, 134 Idaho at 389, 3 P.3d at 67.
Here there is no ambiguity whatsoever. The law is very clear that a teacher must be
employed pursuant to the approved Standard Teacher Contract, and no other.

The School

District has no option to deviate from the Standard Teacher Contract. There is no evidence that
the state superintendent of public instruction approved the School District's addendum contracts,

PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
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nor is there any approval of a deviation from the Standard Teacher Contract. A school district is
not permitted to "go rogue" with its teacher contracts, and these addendum contracts are simply
outside of what the statute and rule allow.
Indeed, if such addendum contracts were somehow permissible, it would eviscerate the
existence of the Standard Teacher Contract.

A teacher could conceivably sign a Standard

Teacher Contract, and then sign an addendum contract the very next day changing any or all of
the terms in the Standard Teacher Contract. In such instance, the statute and rule would be
rendered entirely superfluous.

"It is incumbent upon [the] Court to interpret a statute in a

manner that will not nullify it and it is not to be presumed that the legislature performed an idle
act of enacting a superfluous statute." Sweitzer v. Dean, 118 Idaho 568, 572, 798 P .2d 27, 31
(1990). It is clear, however, from the language of both Idaho Code §33-513(1) and IDAP A
08.02.01.150 that the intent of the state legislature was to have a single, state-wide approved
form to be a standardized contract for all Idaho teachers and no other.
This conclusion is further supported by the Idaho Supreme Court holding in Rhoades v.

Idaho Falls School Dist. No. 91, 131 Idaho 827, 965 P.2d 187 (1998). In Rhoades, the teacher
was not granted a contract for the subsequent year based upon documents that were not part of
the Standard Teacher's Contract. Specifically, the teacher in Rhoades, much like the teachers in
this case, signed a document that was prepared by the school district and was separate and apart
from the Standard Teacher's Contract. Id. at 828, 965 P.2d at 188. The Idaho Supreme Court
squarely held that any document other than the Standard Teacher Contract was "ineffective" and
could not change a teacher rights. The Court held:
LC. § 33-513(1) authorizes the board to employ professional personnel "on
written contract in form approved by the state superintendent of public
instruction." The contract signed by the teacher and the chair of the board for the
1992-93 school year bears a legend that it was prepared pursuant to LC.§ 33-513
PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
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and that any other form of contract must be approved by the State Board of
Education. There is no evidence that the other documents on which the
district relies to remove the protections of the statutes and the master
contract were approved bv the State Superintendent of Public Instruction or
the State Board of Education. Therefore, they were ineffective to change the
rights the teacher had under the statutes and the master contract.
Id. at 830, 965 P.2d 190 (emphasis added).

Certainly, a teacher is entitled to his or her

statutory rights to have the terms and conditions of employment on the Standard Teacher
Contract. Such statutory rights are incorporated into the Standard Teacher Contract itself.
IV. CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, Petitioner is entitled to summary judgment on their Petition for
Declaratory Judgment because Idaho Code, the administrative rule of the State Board of
Education, and Idaho case law all limit a school district's ability to employ a teacher to the
Standard Teacher Contract approved by the state superintendent of public instruction. To hold
otherwise would nullify the law. Petitioner is likewise entitled to attorney fees and costs, and
such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable.

-t<A

DATED this .i_ day of July, 2013.
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION

By:

PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

-~

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on theb
day of July, 2013, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be served via:
-----

U.S. Mail

- - - - - Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivered
to:
William F. "Bud" Yost
Yost Law, PLLC
4 Ogden A venue
P.O. Box 1275
Nampa, Idaho 83653
Facsimile: (208) 466-1981
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Paul J. Stark, Esq.- ISB# 5919
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION
620 North Sixth Street
P.O. Box 2638
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 333-8560
Facsimile: (208) 344-1606

Attorney for Petitioner

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

NAMPA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,
Petitioner,
vs.
NAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 131,
Respondent.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.: CV13-2962-C
AFFIDAVIT OF MANDY SIMPSON
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

)
) ss:
)

I, MANDY SIMPSON, having been duly sworn, depose and say as follows:
1.

I am the President of the Nampa Education Association, Petitioner in this action.

2.

The Nampa Education Association was duly chosen as the representative organization of
the teachers within the Nampa School District for the 2012-2013 school year.

AFFIDAVIT OF MANDY SIMPSON IN SUPPORT OF
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3.

The Nampa Education Association was recognized by the Nampa School District as the
representative organization of the teachers within the Nampa School District for the
2012-2013 school year.

4.

The Nampa Education Association has been duly chosen and recognized as the
representative organization of the teachers within the Nampa School District for the past
several decades.

5.

That in September of 2012, teachers within the Nampa School District signed a Standard
Teacher Contract for the 2012-2013 school year, as teachers have for decades.

6.

Attached as Exhibit "A" and incorporated by this reference are true and correct copies of
the form Standard Teacher Contract (both continuing and category A contracts) offered
by the Nampa School District for the 2012-2013 school year.

7.

On or about the week of December 10, 2012, the Nampa School District began pressuring
teachers to sign an addendum contract by requiring teachers to attend mandatory
"emergency" meetings where the addendum contract was presented.

8.

Attached as Exhibit "B" and incorporated by this reference is a true and correct copy of
the form addendum contract (for both continuing and category A contracts).

9.

Many teachers were told that the addendum contracts had to be signed and returned
within a matter of a few days (December 1ih).

10.

Many teachers felt pressured to sign the addendum contracts by the Nampa School
District and did not consider it voluntary. These teachers expressed fear of retaliation
should they not sign the addendum contracts or if they were to publically state that the
contracts were not voluntarily signed.

AFFIDAVIT OF MANDY SIMPSON IN SUPPORT OF
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11.

I personally attended all of the Nampa School Board of Trustees meetings in the fall of
2012, testifying to the School Board on multiple dates, and the Nampa School Board of
Trustees itself never voted in open session as to the decision to put forward the addendum
contracts.

12.

I have researched the archived minutes of the Nampa School Board of Trustees and have
not found any evidence that the Nampa School Board of Trustees ever voted on whether
to put forward addendum contracts to the teachers of the Nampa School District.

13.

During the week of December 10, 2012, where teachers were being pressured to sign the
addendum contracts, I directed legal counsel to draft a letter to the Nampa School District
explaining the situation.

14.

Attached as Exhibit "C" and incorporated by this reference is a true and correct copy of a
December 14, 2012 letter from Paul Stark to Dr. Thomas Michaelson, Superintendent of
the Nampa School District.

15.

As the high pressure tactics continued, I again directed legal counsel to draft a second
letter to the Nampa School District explaining the situation

16.

Attached as Exhibit "D" and incorporated by this reference is a true and correct copy of a
December 18, 2012 letter from Paul Stark to Dr. Thomas Michaelson, Superintendent of
the Nampa School District.

17.

I have personal knowledge of the matters set forth in this Affidavit and, if called as a
witness, could and would truthfully and competently testify to such matters.

DATED this~ day of July, 2013, at the City of Nampa, County of Canyon, State of Idaho.
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~

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To before me this~ day of July, 2013.

AFFIDAVIT OF MANDY SIMPSON IN SUPPORT OF
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SDE Approved 4/29/20 I l

STATE OF IDAHO

CONTINUING TEACHERS CONTRACT
THIS CONTRACT, made this 151h day of August year of 2012, by and between Nampa School District No. 131, Nampa,
Idaho ("the District"), and «First Name» «Last Name» ("the Teacher").
WITNESSETH:
1. The District hereby employs the Teacher pursuant to Section 33-515, Idaho Code, for the duration of the 2012-2013

school year, consisting of a period of «Position Days» days, and agrees to pay the Teacher for said services a base sum
of «Amount in Words» ($«Amount») of which 1/12lh shall be payable on the 251h day(s) of the months September year
of 2012 to August year of 2013 inclusive, and such other monetary benefits as accorded to its certificated employees by
the District.
2. Teaching assignment(s): «Description» - (Col «Col Head», Step «Row Head»)
and such other duties as may be assigned by the District for which the Teacher is properly certified and endorsed.
3. The Teacher agrees to perform all teaching assignments made by the District in accordance with the highest professional
standards and to have and maintain the legal qualifications required to teach in the aforesaid grades or subjects during all
times that performance is required hereunder.
4. It is understood and agreed between the parties that this Contract is subject to the applicable laws of the State of Idaho,
the duly adopted rules of the State Board of Education and the policies of the District which are, by reference,
incorporated herein and made a part of this agreement the same as if fully set forth herein.
5. Any material false statement knowingly made in the written application for a position with the District shall constitute
sufficient ground for voiding this Contract.
6. The District Board of Trustees may terminate or reduce the full-time equivalency status of this contract upon conclusion
of the school year stated in Section 1 of this contract, without owing any further compensation, in the event that the
Board institutes a reduction in force pursuant to Section 33-522, Idaho Code, resulting in the termination or reduction of
the employment relationship between the District and the Teacher.
7. It is mutually understood and agreed by and between the parties that nothing herein contained shall operate or be
construed as a waiver of any of the rights, powers, privileges, or duties of either party hereto, by and under the laws of
the State of Idaho, except as expressly stated in this Contract.
8. The terms of this Contract shall be subject to amendment and adjustment to conform to the terms of either a Master
Contract or the compensation established the Board of Trustees pursuant to Section 33-1274, Idaho Code, as such terms
are applicable for the same school year as this Contract.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the District has caused this Contract to be executed in its name by its proper officials and the
Teacher has executed the same all on the date first above written.

NAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.131 CANYON COUNTY(IES) STATE OF IDAHO

By
TEACHER

--'~"'"""'_,.tt____._HJ--..#~~·--.l-=--'"'---' CHAIRMAN
BOARD OF TRUSTEES

Attest:

-+).;<_-+-'A_,_
'---'- ..._2J7}bl-'-"'---'--'--"'-c-..,__.--='-------~RINTENDENT OR CLERK

BXHlBIT A
This contract form was prepared pursuant to Section 33-513, Idaho Code, and approved by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, as a contract
which may be used by school districts. Any other form must be approved by the State Superintendent, and reviewed for reapproval every three years.
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STATE OF IDAHO

CATEGORY A TEACHERS CONTRACT
THIS CONTRACT, made this 15th day of August, year of 2012, by and between Nampa School District No. 131, Nampa, Idaho
("the District"), and «First Name» «Last Name» ("the Teacher").
WITNESSETH:
1. The District hereby employs the Teacher pursuant to Section 33-514(2)(a), Idaho Code, for the duration of the 2012-2013 school

year, consisting of a period of «Position Days» days, and agrees to pay the Teacher for said services a base sum of
«Amount in Words» ($«Amount») of which 1112th shall be payable on the 2Slb day(s) of the months September year of 2012 to
August year of 2013 inclusive, and such other monetary benefits as accorded to its certificated employees by the District.
2. Teaching assignment(s): «Description» - (Col «Col Head» Step «Row Head»)
and such other duties as may be assigned by the District for which the Teacher is properly certified and endorsed.
3. The Teacher agrees to perform all teaching assignments made by the District in accordance with the highest professional
standards and to have and maintain the legal qualifications required to teach in the aforesaid grades or subjects during all times
that performance is required hereunder.
4. It is understood and agreed between the parties that this Contract is subject to the applicable laws of the State of Idaho, the duly
adopted rules of the State Board of Education and the policies of the District which are, by reference, incorporated herein and
made a part of this Contract the same as if fully set forth herein, and that no property rights attach to this Contract beyond the
term of this Contract.
5. Any material false statement knowingly made in the written application for a position with the District shall constitute
sufficient ground for voiding this Contract.
6. It is mutually understood and agreed by and between the parties that nothing herein contained shall operate or be construed as a
waiver of any of the rights, powers, privileges, or duties of either party hereto, by and under the laws of the State of Idaho,
except as expressly stated in this agreement.
7. The terms of this Contract shall be subject to amendment and adjustment to conform to the terms of either a Master Contract or
the compensation established the Board of Trustees pursuant to Section 33-1274, Idaho Code, as such terms are applicable for
the same school year as this Contract.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the District has caused this Contract to be executed in its name by its proper officials and the Teacher has
executed the same all on the date first above written.

NAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.131 CANYON COUNTY(IES) STATE OF IDAHO

By
TEACHER

--~._,.,-.tl::......__._H___.~~·J..o~"'---'

CHAIRMAN

BOARDOF TRUSTEES

k~A__,_,.2rlJW
. . . . .~~C--,......~~=====.:::----

Attest: _ ___.

c::Jst;;tRINTENDENT OR CLERK

This contract form was prepared pursuant to Section 33-513, Idaho Code, and approved by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, as a contract which may be
used by school districts. Any other form must be approved by the State Superintendent, and reviewed for reapproval every three years.
«DAC

000055

ADDENDUM TO
CONTINUING TEACHER CONTRACT
THIS ADDENDUM TO CONTINUING TEACHER CONTRACT ("Addendum") is
made this _ _ day of _ _ _ _ _ _ _, 201_, by and between NAMPA SCHOOL
DISTRICT NO. 131, Canyon County, Idaho, State of Idaho (hereinafter called "District") and
- - - - - - - - - - - - - (hereinafter called "Teacher"), collectively referred to as
the "parties."
RECITALS
A.
dated the

District and Teacher entered into a State of Idaho Continuing Teacher Contract
day of _ _ _ _ _ _ _, 2012, for the school year 2012-2013.

B.
District is experiencing significant budgeting problems and will not be able to
fully fund the cash flow requirements for the balance of the 2012-2013 school year.
C.
Teacher desires to participate in a voluntary program to aid District in managing
its necessary cash flow requirements and enable District to meet its required and necessary
obligations.
D.

Now, therefore, the parties covenant and agree as follows.
ADDENDUM

INCORPORATION OF RECITALS: The above recitals are contractual and
binding and are incorporated herein as if set forth in full.
1.

2.
FURLOUGH DAYS: Teacher agrees to contribute one (1) to four (4) furlough
days to District from the following eligible dates (the selected furlough days shall be circled):
•
•
•
•

January 4, 2013
March 8, 2013
March 22, 2013
May 31, 2013.

A furlough day is defined as a voluntary act by Teacher in accepting certain days where Teacher
will not perform his or her customary duties and will receive no compensation for those days. At
the complete discretion of Teacher, he/she may provide services as required under the
Continuing Teacher Contract referred to above in Recital A, but as a volunteer only.
3.
BENEFITS: No reduction will be made to any benefits available or accruing for
and on behalf of Teacher.

ADDENDUM TO CONTINUING TEACHER CONTRACT - 1
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4.
TERM: This Addendum shall apply only to the remainder of the 2012-2013
school year, and this Addendum shall tenninate upon the termination date of the Continuing
Teacher Contract referred to above in Recital A.
5.
NO OTHER AMENDMENTS: It is agreed by and between the parties that
nothing herein contained shall operate or be construed as a waiver of any of the rights, powers,
privileges, or duties of either party hereto, by and under the laws of the State of Idaho, and as
provided in that Continuing Teacher Contract referred to in Recital A, otherwise than is
expressly stated in this Addendum.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, District has caused this Addendum to be executed in its name
by its proper officials, and Teacher has executed the same all on the date first above written.

NAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 131
Canyon County, Idaho

By: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Chairman, Board of Trustees
ATTEST:

Clerk, Board of Trustees

Signature of Teacher
Print Name:

ADDENDUM TO CONTINUING TEACHER CONTRACT - 2
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ADDENDUM TO
CATEGORY A TEACHER CONTRACT
THIS ADDENDUM TO CATEGORY A TEACHER CONTRACT ("Addendum") is
by and between NAMPA SCHOOL
made this __ day of _ _ _ _ _ _ _, 20
DISTRICT NO. 131, Canyon County, Idaho, State of Idaho (hereinafter called "District") and
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (hereinafter called "Teacher"), collectively referred to as
the "parties."
RECITALS
A.
District and Teacher entered into a State of Idaho Category A Teacher Contract
dated the _ _ day of _ _ _ _ _ _ _, 2012, for the school year 2012-2013.
B.
District is experiencing significant budgeting problems and will not be able to
fully fund the cash flow requirements for the balance of the 2012-2013 school year.
C.
Teacher desires to participate in a voluntary program to aid District in managing
its necessary cash flow requirements and enable District to meet its required and necessary
obligations.
D.

Now, therefore, the parties covenant and agree as follows.
ADDENDUM

1.
INCORPORATION OF RECITALS: The above recitals are contractual and
binding and are incorporated herein as if set forth in full.

2.
FURLOUGH DAYS: Teacher agrees to contribute one (1) to four (4) furlough
days to District from the following eligible dates (the selected furlough days shall be circled):
•
•
•
•

January 4, 2013
March 8, 2013
March 22, 20 13
May 31, 2013.

A furlough day is defined as a voluntary act by Teacher in accepting certain days where Teacher
will not perform his or her customary duties and will receive no compensation for those days. At
the complete discretion of Teacher, he/she may provide services as required under the Category
A Teacher Contract referred to above in Recital A, but as a volunteer only.
3.
BENEFITS: No reduction will be made to any benefits available or accruing for
and on behalf of Teacher.
ADDENDUM TO CATEGORY A TEACHER CONTRACT - I

4.
TERM: This Addendum shall apply only to the remainder of the 2012-2013
school year, and this Addendum shall terminate upon the termination date of the Category A
Teacher Contract referred to above in Recital A.
5.
NO OTHER AMENDMENTS: It is agreed by and between the parties that
nothing herein contained shall operate or be construed as a waiver of any of the rights, powers,
privileges, or duties of either party hereto, by and under the laws of the State of Idaho, and as
provided in that Category A Teacher Contract referred to in Recital A, otherwise than is
expressly stated in this Addendum.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, District has caused this Addendum to be executed in its name
by its proper officials, and Teacher has executed the same all on the date first above written.

NAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 131
Canyon County, Idaho

By:

--------------Chairman, Board of Trustees

ATTEST:

Clerk, Board of Trustees

Signature of Teacher
Print Name:

ADDENDUM TO CATEGORY A TEACHER CONTRACT- 2
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IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION
P.O. BOX 2638, BOISE, IDAHO 83701-2638, 620 N. SIXTH STREET, 83702

208/333-8560

December 14, 2012

VIA FACSIMILE & US MAIL

Dr. Thomas Michaelson, Superintendent
Nampa School District
619 S. Canyon Street
Nampa, Idaho 83686

Re:

Illegal Addendum Contracts

Dear Superintendent Michaelson:

It has recently come to my attention that the Nampa School District is requiring teachers
within the School District to attend mandatory meetings, and then pressuring those teachers to
accept a change in terms and conditions of their employment.' The teachers in Nampa are
certainly very concerned and invested in the welfare of the School District. These high pressure
tactics, however, are not only improper, but also illegal. For reasons discussed below, I am
writing to ask that these actions immediately cease and the School District comply with the clear
requirements of the law.
First, it is my understanding that the School District is requiring teachers to attend the
mandatory, "emergency" meetings so that the School District can essentially pressure these
educators into signing a contract labeled as an "Addendum" to the existing contracts. These
meetings have been going on continually this week, and the School District has required that
these "Addendums" be returned no later than Monday, December 17, 2012. It is unclear where
this artificial deadline comes from. It is certainly not contained in Idaho law. What is more
troubling is that by doing so, the School District has violated the provisions of Idaho Code §§331271, et seq. and acted in violation of the good faith provisions of that act. See Gilbert v.
Nampa School Dist. No. 131, 104 Idaho 137,657 P.2d 1 (1983). The conduct of the School
District in these efforts amounts to illegal direct dealing, which is universally been held to be
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000060

Dr. Thotnas Michaelsen, Superintendent
Nampa School District
December 14, 2012
Page - 2

acting in bad faith. Naperville Ready Mix, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 242 F.3d 744 (2001). See also
Intemational Ass'n of Firefighters, Local No. 672 v. City of Boise City, 136 Idaho 162, 30 P.3d
940 (2001).
With your recent employment in Idaho you may not recognize that Idaho Code §33-1271
requires all negotiations regarding the terms and conditions of employment of certificated
personnel be negotiated with the duly recognized local education organization. This has long
been the relationship in Nampa. Indeed, the Nampa School District has recognized the Nampa
Education Association as the lawful "local education organization" and has this very year
negotiated with that organization. Idaho Code §33-1271 further requires both parties to negotiate
in good faith. The recent and unprecedented actions of the School District, however, have
seemingly ignored the clear requirements of the law. Indeed, it is noteworthy that neither you
nor your administration has even once attempted to discuss the cmTent critical situation with
Nampa Education Association President Ms. Mandy Simpson. Instead, you have chosen to
dispense with the law and bargain directly with the teachers individually in an effort that can
only be seen as an unsavory attempt to apply more pressure and intimidation. If it were not so,
then please explain why you have made no effort to meet and discuss these matters with Ms.
Simpson. This is clearly bad faith on the School District's part.
I would also like to point out that these "Addendums" are, under both statutory and Idaho
Supreme Court case law,per se illegal. Idaho Code §33-513(1) provides that the School Board
has the power and duty: "To employ professional personnel, on written contract in form
approved hv the state superintendent of public instruction, conditioned upon a valid certificate
being held by such professional personnel at the time of entering upon the duties thereunder."
(Emphasis added.) There is no indication that these "Addendum" forms have been so approved.
Further, the Idaho Supreme Court has unambiguously held that any documents not approved, as
required by this statute, are "ineffective to change the rights the teacher had under the statutes
and the master contract." Rhoades v. Idaho Falls School Dist. No. 91, 131 ldaho 827, 830, 965
P.2d 187, 190 (1998). Therefore, these "Addendum" contracts that the Nampa teachers are being
pressured into signing, as well as the administrator's version of the "Addendum," are illegal.
Again, it is unprecedented for the Nampa School District to take such illegal actions.
I need to also note that the teachers in Nampa are very concerned with the current
situation that, as you know, is not of their making. The teachers are extremely concerned as to
what effect the mismanagement by the former administration will have on the education of the
children in Nampa School District. Certainly, this is not a situation anyone would wish to have
occurred. That said, this crisis should not be taken as an opportunity to circumvent the law and
its requirements. Further, l would encourage you to actually meet with the teachers' duly

Dr. 'l1t0111as ivi ichaeison, Superimendem
Nampa School District
December 14, 2012
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recognized representatives to collabomte on solutions, Unfortunately, as of the date of this
correspondence, that has not occurred.

Sincerely,

cc:

Mandy Simpson
Scott Kido, Board Chair
Region Directors

,.,;

(
A

~~

IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION

P.O. BOX 2638, BOISE, IOAHO 83701-2638, 620 N. SIXTH STREET, 83702

208/344-1341

'--

www.idahoea.org

FAX 208/336-6967

December 18, 2012
VIA FACSIMILE & US. MAIL

Dr. Thomas Michaelson, Superintendent
Nampa School District
619 S. Canyon Street
Nampa, Idaho 83686
Re:

Addendum Contracts

Dear Superintendent Michaelson:
I am unfortunately writing again regarding the Addendum contracts that teachers in the
Nampa School District are being compelled to sign. I have spoken with numerous teachers
within the School District and there is considerable pressure being applied and felt, to the point
where most teachers feel as if they have no choice. Teachers are feeling that if they do not sign
the Addendum contract that they will be subjected to adverse job action, retaliation and in some
instances are actually having their administrator looking over the shoulder, telling them to sign
the Addendum contract as it is being reviewed. Regardless of whether they are occurring under
the school district's directive, the district has an obligation to stop these tactics. Again, I must
renew my demand that the School District cease these activities.
I must also reiterate that the contracts that are being presented by the School District are
not on forms approved by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction. See Idaho Code §33513(1 ). See also Rhoades v. Idaho Falls School Dist. No. 91, 131 Idaho 827, 830, 965 P.2d
187, 190 (1998). Therefore, these contracts are illegal and unenforceable. Indeed, the Rules of
the Idaho State Department of Education are explicit in this matter:
DEVIATION FROM STANDARD EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT FORM.
The State Superintendent of Public Instruction has approved a standard
employment contract form. Any deviation from this contract form must be
approved by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction and reviewed for
reapproval once every three (3) years. (Section 33-513, Idaho Code)
IDAPA 08.02.01.150. (Emphasis added.)
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Dr. Thomas Michaelson, Superintendent
Nampa School District

December l 8, 2012
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In light of this, I am asking that you immediately direct your administration to cease all
further activities in relation to these addendum contracts. Fmiher, I ask that you communicate
with all the teachers in the Nampa School District informing them of these facts, and declaring
that the Nampa School District will not attempt to enforce any addendum contracts that have
already been signed,
Please respond to this correspondence as soon as possible. I appreciate your attention to
this most unfortunate turn of events.
Sincerely,

cc:

Mandy Simpson
Scott Kido, Board Chair
Region Directors

A.k~.M.

F i
-- /4JL 1 2 20\3

William F. Yost, ISB No. 1242
Chip Giles, ISB No. 9135
Yost Law, PLLC
4 Ogden Avenue
PO Box 1275
Nampa, Idaho 83653
Telephone: 208-466-9222
Facsimile: 208-466~1981

CANYON COUNTY CLERK

c.oYE,DEPUTY

Attorneys for Respondent

IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRJCT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
NAMPA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,
Petitioner,
VS.

)
) Case No. CV 2013-2962-C
)
) RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO
) PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR

) SUM1\.:1ARY JUDGMENT

NAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 131,

)
)

Respondent.
)
~--------------·)
COMES NOW the Respondent, NAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 131, ("Distrid') by
and through its counsel of record, William F. Yost and Chip Giles, of Yost Law, PLLC, and replies
to Petitioner's C'NEN'), Motion for Summary Judgment as follows:

I. INTRODUCTION
Notwithstanding the District's position set forth in its Motion for Summary Judgment that
based on lack of standing, the NEA's Petition is improper1 and no genuine issue as to any
material fact exists, the District files the reply herein for the limited purposes of reiterating the
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District's position on standing, to provide the Conrt with

proper analysis regarding Idaho

Code§ 33-513, and to address issues concerning the affidavit of Mandy Simpson.
II. ARGUMENT
A. The NEA lacks standing to bring the Petition, and likewise lacks standing to move for

Summary Judgment.
Under Idaho law, the NEA lacks standing to file the petition upon which this action is
based. It follows that the NEA also lacks standing to move for Summary Judgment
Idaho courts have ruled that in order to prove standing, "litigants generally must allege or
demonstrate an iajmy in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will
prevent or redress the claimed injury." Miles v. Idaho Power Comptmy, 116 Idaho 635, 641, 778
P.2d 757, 763 (1989). In Miles, the Court also held that standing requires a showing of a
"distinct and palpable injury." Id. at 641.
As a teachers union, the NEA has not, and cannot allege an injury in fact. Furthermore,
the NEA ha.s failed to show a distinct and palpable injury. The process surrounding the
addendum contracts was completely voluntary, and a completely voluntary act cannot produce a
"distinct and palpable" injury.

By way of relief, Petitioner requests the previously executed voluntary addendum
contracts be declared unlawful or unenforceable. Such relief will do nothing to prevent or redress
the injury claimed. The agreement to volunteer furlough days has been fully executed, and
declaring the agreement's unlawful will not redress any perceived or claimed injury. This failure
to prove redressability is an additional bar to the NEA's standing. Pursuant to Idaho law, the
NEA has failed to establish standing to bring this petition, and therefore lacks standing to request

summary judgment.
Idaho courts have also addressed the issue of standing for associations ruling, "as applied
to associations seeking standing for its members, this court considers whether the association has
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alleged that at least one of its members faces injury and could meet the requirements of standing
on an individual basis." 111. re Jerome County Bd of Comm'ts, 153 Idaho 298. 281 PJd 1076,
1082 (2012).
In re Jerome County, concerned several envirorunent?l groups petition for review of a

decision ordered by the Jerome County Board of Comrnissioners. ·nie Idaho Supreme Court
ruled that only groups with members whose primary residences were within one mile of the
proposed site, or adjacent to the proposed site could be severely affected. The Court denied
standing to other groups that did not have members living in close proximity to the proposed site.
In summary, the Idaho Supreme Court refuses to grant standing to plaintiff's unless they have
been, or could be harmed by an alleged action.

Like the Plaintiffs denied standing in Jerome County, th.e NEA has failed to name any
member directly harmed by the signing of the voluntary addendum contracts. In support of its
Motion for Summary Judgment the NEA attaches the Affidavit of Mandy Simpson ("Ms.
Simpson"). Her Affidavit does not provide any facts or allegations that she was personally
harmed by the signing of an addendum contract. She appears to rely on her position as president
of the NEA to speak to the alleged harm of other members, even though she alleges no harm to
herself Ms. Simpson has not; and could not have been harmed by the NEA's alleged actions, and
she does not so state in her affidavit. The Idaho Supreme Court has refused to grant standing in
similar situations lacking allegations of potential or present ha.rm.
Since Ms. Simpson's Affidavit fails to allege a personal harm, and in the absence of any
NEA members allegation of harm, the NEA fails to meet the Idaho requirements for
associational standing. Therefore, under the associational standing analysis, the NEA lacks
standing to bring this Motion for Summary Judgment.
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B. Petitioner's argument that the addendum contracts are as a matter of law illegal is not
supported by Idaho Statue or case law.

The NEA argues that since the voluntary contracts presented to teachers as a one-time

measure to address a financial crisis faced by the District were not on a form approved by the
state superintendent of public education, the contracts are as a matter of law illegal and
unenforceable. The NEA relies on Idaho Code § 33-513 which provides:
The board of trustees of each school district including any
specifically chartered district, shall have the following powers and
duties:

1.

To employ professional personnel, on written contract in a
form approved by the state superintendent of public instruction,
conditioned upon a valid certificate being held by such
professional personnel at the· time of entering upon the duties
thereunder. (Emphasis added).

The foregoing statute applies to employment contracts, otherwise known as a standard
teacher contract or ''master contract." The contracts in this case were voluntary agreements with
teacher's for furlough days, not employment contracts pursuant to LC. § 33-513. The NEA has

failed to provide any authority wJ:ijch would subject the voluntary agreement signed by Nampa
teachers to the purview ofldaho Code 33-513.

The only authority cited by the NEA in an attempt w apply I.C. § 33-513 to the voluntary
addendum contracts is Rhoades v. Idaho Falls School Dist. No. 91. The facts in Rhodes should
be considered by the Court In Rhoades a teacher signed a stmdard teacher contract describing
her salary as "Adjusted Base Salary for 190 days, 50 percent of teaching day --$10,158.00." The
chair of the district's board of trustees signed the contract on behalf of the district. The contract
also provided "this contract is for one year only and is non-renewable. While you will be given
consideration for any openings that may occur for the 1993-94 school year, you will need to re-

apply through the regular application process." Rhoades v. Idaho Falls School Dist. No. 91 131
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Idaho 827, 965 P.2d 187 (Idaho 1998). The District's reduction in force policy was also attached
to the contract. Id.
The teacher in Rhodes fulfilled her obligations under the contract; and on March 29, 1993
the District Superintendent sent the following letter.
You were hired on a One Year Contract for the 1992-93 school
year. This letter is to notify you that, as of tbs time, the school
district does not anticipate needing your services for the coming
year. Thank you for your services rendered to the students of
School District 91 during this school year. If a future position
should open for which you are qualified, I hope you would submit
your application. Id.
The Court ultimately ruled that the Board of Trustees failed to take proper action pursuant to the
then existing version of Idaho Code § 33-513(1) which provided for teacher contract renewal.
The Court found the District in Rhodes erred '·when the superintendent, instead of the board,
gave the teacher the reason for not reemploying her in the March 29 1 1993 letter, and there was
no evidence that the district implemented· a reduction in force pursuant to the policy in the
negotiated agreement." Id. at 830.
The holding in Rhodes requires District's to abide by Idaho Code for reductions in force,
or a decision not to renew a non-continuing contract teacher's contract. The case addresses
employment contracts. The holding does not analyze voluntary agreements between teachers and
a school district. As a result, the ruling in Rhodes does nothing to support the NEA' s argument
that the voluntary addendum contracts are as a matter of law illegal.
Moreover, the voluntary addendum contracts were a one-time> voluntary measure on
behalf of District employees. The voluntariness of the agreement is evidenced by the affidavit of
Steve Kipp (former human resource officer for the District), which is properly before the Court,
and attached to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment In his affidavit, Mr. Kipp avers to
the fact that once approximately 545 staff members volunteered one or more furlough days,
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approximateiy 24 certified teachers later modified their agreements, either adding to or reducing
the number of volunteer furlough days. (Aff. of Steve Kipp p.
C.

The affidavit of Mandy Simpson is based on n,nnri·1111 anti Petiti<mer objects to
consideration of portions of the affidavit pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
56(e).

I.R.C.P. 56(e), Form of Affidavit-Further Testimony Defense Required, provides in
relevant part:
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent
to testify to the matters stated therein.
To support the pertinent assertions in her affidavit regarding the coercion of teachers to
sign the vohmtary addendum contracts, Ms. Simpson relies on the out of court statements of
others. In her affidavit Ms. Simpson alleges, "On or about the week of December 10, 2012, the
Nampa School District began pressuring teachers to sign an addendum contract by requiring
teachers to attend mandatory "emergency" meetings where the addendum contract was

presented." Simpson Aff. pp. 7. Ms. Simpson further states "many teachers were told that the
addendum contracts had to be signed and returned within a matter of a few days." Simpson Aff.
pp. 9. Ms. Simpson also states "teachers expressed fear of retaliation should they not sign the
addendum contracts or if they were to publically state that the contracts were not voluntarily
signed." Simpson Aff. pp. 10.

The above assertions are hearsay, and not subject to any hearsay exception provided by
the Idaho Rules of Evidence. Additionally paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 7, 10, 13, and 14 of Ms. Simpson's
affidavit are based on hearsay. Since the testimony in paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13 and 14 of
Ms. Simpson's affidavit would not be admissible in court, Respondent objects to consideration
of those paragraphs pursuant to LR.C.P. 56(e).
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ID. CONCLUSION
The NEA has failed to respond to the Disrrict's Motion for Summary Judgment, or
address the standing issue before the court. Since the

has failed to establish standing in

order to bring this action, it follows that Petitioner also lacks standing to bring this Motion for

Summary Judgment. Additionally paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13 and 14 of the affidavit of
Mandy Simpson are based on hearsay. As a result, Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment
should be denied, Respondent's Motion for Summa.ry Judgment should be granted, and the
objection to the above-mentioned paragraphs of Ms. Simpson's affidavit should be noted by the

Court.
Respectfully submitted this 12th day of July, 2013.

YOST LAW, PLLC

v__-______

By: _ _
Chip Giles

Attorney for Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 12th day of July, 2013, I caused to be served by the method
indicated below a true and correct copy of the foregoing document upon:

Paul J. Stark

Idaho Education Association
620 North 6th St
POBox2638

US.Mail
Overnight Mail
_Ha..'ld Delivery
lL Facsimile No. 344-1606

Boise. ID 83701

Chip Giles
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Paul J. Stark, Esq.- ISB #5919
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION
620 North Sixth Street
P.O. Box 2638

Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 333-8560
Facsimile: (208) 344-1606

Attorney for Petitioner

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

NAMPA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,
Petitioner,

)
)
)

)
vs.
NAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 131,

Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)

Case No.: CVl 3-2962-C
PETITIONER'S ME~10Rf\NDCM
IN OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGrv1ENT

------------ J

ARGUME~T
A.

Petitioner has Standing to Bring this Action.
Under Idaho case law precedent, Petitioner has stai:ding to bring this matter be:o:e the

court on a declaratory judgment. Accordingly, Responden:'s :v1otion for Summary Judgment on
the argument Petitioner lacks standing must be denied.
The Idaho Supreme Court, in the case of Bear Lake Educ. Ass n v. Board of Trs. of Bear
1

Lake Sch. Dist. No. 33, 116 Idaho 443, 776 P.2d 452 (l 989), definitively he1d that a11 association,
must like Petitioner in this case, have standing to bring an a~tion on behalf of its teachers as well
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as on its own behalf. In Bear Lake, the District Court ruled in favor of the School District on a
summary judgment motion, however the Idaho Supreme Comt vacated the order and remanded
the case back to the District Court. Id. at 444, 776 P,2d at 453. Much like this case, the School
District in Bear Lake argued that the Bear Lake Education Association did not have standing to
invoke the jurisdiction of the court.
After reciting the law on standing, the Idaho Supreme Court held, "There is no question
that an association may have standing in its own right to seek judicial relief from i11jury to itself
and to vindicate whatever rights and immunities the association itself may enjoy." Id. at 448, 776
P.2d at 457 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975)).

The Court went on to

conclude, "If in a proper case the association seeks a declaration, injunction, or some other form
of prospective relief, it can reasonably be supposed that the remedy, if granted, will inure to the
benefit of those members of the association actually injured. Id. Indeed, Petitioner's "interest in
having the agreement[s] enforced is germane to the Association's purpose and affects the
associational ties of all the teachers." Id. at 448, 776 P.2d at 457.
Here, as in Bear Lake, the Nampa Education Association was chosen as the exclusive
organization to represent all of the certificated educators in the Nampa School District
(excluding administrators). See Affidavit of Mandy Simpson 1,i 2-4. See also Idaho Code §331273. Further, as in Bear Lake, the relief requested by Petitioner is that contractual terms, as
well as statutory mandates, be enforced. The terms of the Standard Teacher Contract signed by
all the teachers in the Nampa School District incorporate by reference the laws of the state of
Idaho, the Rules of the Board of Education and the policies of the School District as follows:
It is understood and agreed between the parties that this Contract is subject to the
applicable laws of the State of Idaho, the duly adopted rules of the State Board of
Education and the policies of the District which are, by reference, incorporated
herein and made a part of this agreement the same as if fully set forth herein.
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See Affidavit of Mandy Simpson, Exhibit A
incorporation of Idaho Code

s 33-513

This

(limiting contracts ro

superintendent of public instruction) as well as IDAP A
deviations from the Standard Teacher Contract).

reference

the

appro 1:ed

state

.150 (proliibiting unapproved

Petitioner bas alleged actual or threatened

injury by way of the four (4) unpaid furlough days and that t:ie Addendum Contract:, v:ere: not
voluntarily entered into by Petitioner's members.

See Petition

Declaratory Judg::nent;

Affidavit of Mandy Simpson. A :finding of individualized ir:jury, hmvever, is unnecessary. The
Idaho Supreme Court, determining associational standing has held:
The question of associational standing often turns on the n2.ture of the relief
sought. When an association seeks so.me form of prospective relief such as a
declaration or an injunction, its benefits will l1kely be shared by the association's
members without any need for individualized fr1<lings of injury tha: ;,vould
require the direct participation of its members as named pwies. Hunt [v.
Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 ( 977)] 432 U.S. at 343, 97
S.Ct. at 2441, 53 L.Ed.2d at 394. "Indeed," wrote
United States Sup::ene
Court in Hunt, ''in all cases in v,;hlch we have expressiy recognized standing in
associations to represent their members, the relief
has been of this kine."
Id (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 515, 95 S.Ct. at 2213,
L.Ed.2d at 364).

Moreover, the violation of statutory rights, not only by incorporation into cont,act, but
also by virtue of their existence as standalone statutory protections for teachers, can itself create
the requisite injury. As the Court further held: "[S]tanding often turns on the nature and sou:-ce

of the claim asserted, the actual or threatened injury maY exist solely by Yirtue of 'statutes

creating legal rights.'" Id. at 448-49, 776 P.2d at457-58 (quofing Linda R.S v. Richard D., 410
C .S. 614, 617 (1973)). And here, as in Bear Lake, the possibili:y that t.he School Board 1..vou;d be
allowed to unilaterally terminate/modify the Standard Teacher Contract "affects all
members and, therefore, vests the Association \vith standir:g." Id at 449, 776 P.2d at 458.
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:he

The language of the Declaratory Judgment Act iBc::f ciemonstrates that
standing to bring this action and that it was the legislatures

for such

to

t0

as the

nature of a declaratory

case at bar. Idaho Code § !0-1212 in particular demonstrate the
judgment action, "This act is declared

has

be remedial; its purpose is to settle and to afford relief

from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, stat.1s anc ot:1er legal relations, a:1d is co be

liberally construed and administered.'' The broad scope

this act is further supported

the

criteria of what sort of determinations can be sought. Idaho Code § I 0-1202 provides:

Anv person interested under a deed, \Vilt, ·written contract 01: other writings
constituting a contract or any oral contract, or ·whose rights, status or o:her lega:
relations are aftected by a statute, municipal ordinance. contract or franchise, mav
have determined anv question of construction or validity arising under the
instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of

rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.
(Emphasis added.) Idaho Code§ 10-1213 defines "person" to include parties such as Petitioner.
Moreover, a contract may be construed either before or after t:.1ere has been a breach.

Ide.ho

Code§ 10-1203. It is also noteworthy that a court is vested with authority to make declaratory
determinations of rights '"whether or not further relief is or

be c :aimed." Idaho Code § l 0-

1201.

Based upon the forgoing, Petitioner has standing to bring this declaratory judgxent
action and Respondent's summary judgment on these grounds must be denied.

B.

Petitioner's Claims are Not Moot.
Petitioner's claims are not moot because there is a definite 2nd concrete legs.i issue co be

resolved that touches upon the legal relations of the parties having adverse legal interests.
The standard for determining whether an issue is moot in

2.

declaratory judgment action

was articulated by the Idaho Supreme Court just a few months ago in the case of Bett·,vieser v.

New York Irrigation Dist., 154 Idaho 317,297 P.3d 1134 (2013). In Betttt,ieser, the Court held
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that under Idaho's Declaratory Judgment Act, the trial

s jurisdiction is limited to cases

"where an actual or justiciable controversy exists," and cmms are

precluded "from deciding

cases which are purely hypothetical or advisory." Id. at 326,

P.3d a 1143 (qu01ing

Idaho Transp. Bd., 151 Idaho 26, 31,253 P.3d 700, 705 (2011

The Beuv:ieser Cow1 v,ent on

to discuss the factors involved in determining whether a justiciable cor:troversy exists as follows:
This Coun has explained that a justiciable controversy
[D]istinf::,ruished from a difference or dispute
a hypothetical or
abstract character; from one that is academ:c or moot .... The
controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal
relations of the parties having adverse legal interests .... It must be a
real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through
a decree of a conclusive character, as distingt:ished from an
opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state
of facts.
Davidson v. Wright, 143 Idaho 616, 620, 151 P.3d 812, 816 (2006) (quoting
Weldon v. Bonner County Tax Coalition, 124 Idaho 31, 36, 855 P.2d 868, 873
(1993)). Therefore, "[a]n action for declaratory judgment is moot where the
judgment, if granted, would have no effect either directly or collaterally on the
plaintiff, the plaintiff would be unable to obtain farther relief based on the
judgment and no other relief is sought in the action." FVylie, 151 Idaho at 32,253
P.3d at 706 (quoting Idaho Schs. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v Idaho State Bd
of Educ., 128 Idaho 276,282,912 P.2d 644,650 (1996)).
Betf1;1.•ieser v. Nen York Irrigation Dist., J 54 Idaho 317, 297 P.3d 1134 (2013).

Applying the standards articulated above, Petitioner's claims are clearly not moo:, but
actual and justiciable.

There is nothing hypothetical or abstract about Petitioner's claim.

Respondent violated a clear and unambiguous requirement of both statute and rule by creating its
own unapproved contract that modified the terms and conditions of employment existing in the
approved Standard Teacher Contract. Then the School District administration acting alone and

without any approval of the School Board required teachers to atter:d mai,datory "eoergency"
meetings where many were pressured to sign the addendum contracts. See Affidavtt of M~'ldy
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Simpson.

By doing so, teachers in the school district lmd

contractual and statutory

but a definite and concrete

protections violated. This is not a hypothetical or abstract
controversy, touching the Jegal relations of the ).Tampa
judgment in favor of Petitioner in this matter would have a

and its teachers.

a

effec.: on both Petitioner r:11d al'.

the teachers because it would prevent this sort of illegal actiYity in
able to obtain further relief based on the judgment under

futur~ a:od either would be
Code ~ l 0-1201.

It simply

cannot be said that judgment if granted to Petitioner "wouk: have no effect either directly or

collaten•Jly on [Petitioner]."

Bettwieser, supra.

ln sho::-t, there is an actual and justiciable

controversy in this matter that had reaJ financial conseqciences tha:. is also cape.bk of being
repeated in the future.
Respondent asserts that due to the mere passage of time that Petitioner's claims are moot.
The Idaho Supreme Court, ho\.vever, has squarely rejected such "passage of time" a:·gu:1:ents.

See School Dist. No. 351 Oneida County v. Oneida Ed Ass'n. 98 Idaho 486, 489, 567 P.2d 830,
833 (1977). See also Robinson v. Bodily, 541 P.2d 623, 624, 97 Idaho 199, 200 (1975); ,Velson

v. Marshall, 94 ldaho 726,728,497 P.2d 47, 49 (1972).
In addition, as a matter of public policy, these teacher protections should be safeguarded
from illegal modifications u.,_11der so called addendum contracts.

\Vhether some z,ddendurn

contracts may have been voluntary and others may not h,rve been is itTelevant if tk comracts

themselves were illegal ab initio. Since the right to have a teaching contract only on a fo:-m
approved by 1.he state superintendent of public instruction is established by stamte, there is an
issue of whether such modifications or waivers, voluntary or other.vise, are prohibited as a

matter of public policy. There appears to be little by way of Ic.aho Supreme Com~ c2.Se law on
this issue. Legal scholars, however, have explained that \\'hen a law is establish.ea for a public
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reason, it cannot be contravened by a p1ivate agreemen:

rights guaranteed u:--,der a

statute:

It is obvious what when a right, a privilege, or a
is confened upon an
individual by the law, it is conferred upon him because it is believed to be in the
public interest to do so. In many such cases it is believed to be contrary to the
public interest to permit him to ,vaive or bargain away the right, privilege, or
defense; and when it is so believed the attempted waiver or bargair. is inopc:-ative.
In these cases the waiver or bargain may itself be described as 'illegal' but on~y in
the sense that it jg legally L'10perative.

6A Corbin, Contracts, § 1515 "Power to Waive or Bargain Away Rights and Defenses Conferred

by Statute" pp. 728-73 L
The proper manner to modify the terms and conditions of a Standard Teacher Contract
is to either utilize the collective bargaining process contained in Idaho Code §
to declare a financial emergency pursuant to Idaho Code §33-522.

1271 et seq, or

There is simply no statutory

a'..Ithority whatsoever for a school district to draft its own unapproved I contracts changing the
terms of employment, and then bypass the exclusive bargainir,g representative (see Idaho Code
§33-1273) and direct dealing with the teachers. See Napervi!l::: Ready Mix, Inc v.

R.B, 242

F.3d 744 (2001).
Accordingly, Petitioner's claims are not moot anc summary judgment on these grounds
must be denied.

C.

Petitioner's Claims are Ripe.
There is a real and substantial controversy as to whether the addendum contracts were

Iega1.

The illegality of those contracts would make modifications of the Standard Teacher

Unapproved by either the superintendent of public instruction and/or by the Nampa School District Board
of Trustees. See Gilmore v. Bonner County School Dist. No. 82, 132 Idaho 257,260, 971 P.2d 323,326 (1999)

("The board has the responsibility and exclusive authority to employ both professional and noncerti:icated personnel
necessary to maintain and operate the schools in the district. The board and the teachers within the school district
expect that the board will make employment decision and that those decisions will follow the correct statutory
procedure.) (citations omitted.)

PETITIONER'S MEMORAl\TDUM IN OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 7

000078

Contracts void as a matter of law. Further, the furlough

that came about fro:n

illegal

addendum contracts have real and significant financial consec.uences upon the already budened

teachers in the school district Thus, the illegality of the

contracrs is

the

court's consideration and Respondent's motion for summary judgment on ripeness grounds must
be denied.

The Idaho Supreme Court has held: "The tradi1iornJ.l ripeness doctrine requires a
petitioner or plaintiff to prove 1) that the case presents definite and concrete issues,

that a real

and substantial controversy exists, and 3) that there is a present need for adj;;dication." Noh v.

Cenarrusa, 137 Jdaho 798, 801, 53 P.3d 1217, 1220 (2002) (citing Boundary Backpackers v.
Boundmy Cnty .. 128 Idaho 371,376,913 P.2d 1141, 1146 C 996)).

As argued above, this case presents definite and concrete issues.

The statutory

requirement that teachers only be employed on a form approved by the superintendent of public
instruction is clear and unambiguous. The rule of the State Board

Education that there car: be

no deviation from the approved Standard Teacher Contracr is likewise clear and U'12.nbiguous.
The Respondent flatly ignored these importa.rit protections for teachers and crafted their own
contract modifying the approved form for their own pu:poses.

The Respondent then forced

teachers to attend a mandatory "emergency" meeting to procure i:he signing o: the illegal
contracts. Further, should the court not address these issues, there is nothing to pre·vent these
improper and illegal actions from occurring in the fuu:re.

The mere passage of time will

continue to be asserted as a mechanism to violate the clear mandates of the law.

Rea'. and

concrete issues are currently before the court, which need to be 2.ddressed to prevent such ac:ions

in the future and to uphold the statutory protections of teachers.
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A real and substantial controversy exists as well. PetitioTier maintains that

addendum

. See 1'vforriso11 v. Yo1mg, 136

contract, voluntary or not, are per se illegal as a matter

Idaho 316, 317, 32 P.3d 1116, 1117 (200 l)("\Vhether a contract is illegal is a question oflaw for
the Court to determine from all the facts and circumstances of each case.").

See A.ns·wer ro Petition for

position is that the addendum contracts are legal and

Declaratory, Judgment.

Respondent's

\\'hether such addendum contracts are legal or illegal is a real and

substantial difference.
Lastly, there is an absolute and present need for adjudication. TI1e use of an addendum
contract by Respondent is something that has not occurred before in [daho.

Respondent is

plowing new soi] by executing a Standard Teacher Contract in September 2012 and then
drafting its o\vn unapproved contract just 3 months later. Further, the undisputed fact that the
School Board did not approve of such addendum contracts is also unprecedented in Idaho. Such
actions by Respondent, if upheld, would render the statute protecting teachers from such conduct

a nullity. See Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 149 lda:io 107,116,233 P.3d 38, 47 (2009)
("[I]t is not to be presumed that the legislature performed an idle &ct of enacting a superfluous
statute."). The parties need an adjudication of this issue for not only this immediate matter, but
also future attempts to bypass the statutory protections of teachers.

CONCLUSION"
Based upon the foregoing, Respondent's summary judgment motion must be denied.
1-::l-,~'

DATED this~ day of July, 2013.

IDAHO EDUCATION ,ASSOCIATION

(
_
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·
.
; L). 1e:-·•,1, "~
By

i. .¥ .r
,,,

" v~1 • ""
Pauv.f/Stark

i.(

~ ,,,~
,._/ -~

AttdJJtey for Plaintiff Nampa Educati::m Association
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
.k----.

Ff

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of
2013, r caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM TK OPPOSHIO:-J TO
RESPONDE1\1T'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be served via:
_ _ _ _ _ U.S. Mail

-~Y..--=-'__ Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivered

to:
WilJirun F. "Bud" Yost
Yost Law, PLLC
4 Ogden Avenue
P.O. Box 1275
Nampa, Idaho 83653

Facsimile: (208) 466-1981
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William 'f. Yost} ISB No. 1242
Chip Giles, ISB No. 9135
Yost Law, PLLC

4 Ogden Avenue
PO Box 1275
Nampa, Idaho 83653
Telephone: 208-466-9222
Facsimile: 208-466-1981

F -I

Attorneys for Respondent

A.k~~~ 9,,M.

JUL 2 5 2013
CANYON COUNTY CLERK
T. CF'{AWFORD, OEPUTY
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRlCT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
NAMPA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,
Petitioner,
vs.

NAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 131.

)
) Case No. CV 2013-2962-C
)

) RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO
) PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM IN
) OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
)
)
)
)

Respondent.
______________

COMES NOW the Respondent, NAMPA SCHOOL DISTR1CT NO. 131, (''District") by
and through its counsel of record, William F. Yost and Chip Giles, of Yost Law, PLLC, and replies
to Petitioner's Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment as
follows:

ARGUMENT
A.

The voluntary agreements to take furlough days were not subject to Idaho Code

Section 33-513.
The reply regarding standing is under Section B below. The issue regarding the vohmtary

agreements between the teachers and the District is not subject to Idaho Code Section 33w513,

which provides as follows:
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The board of trustees of each school district including any
specifically chartered district, shall have the following powers and
duties:
l. To employ professional personnel, on written contract in a
form approved by the state superintendent of public
instruction, conditioned upon a valid certificate being held
by such professional personnel at the time of entering upon
the duties thereunder. (Emphasis added.)
Idaho Code Section 33-513 applies only to the initial teacher employment contracts, and
does not apply to the voluntary agreements regarding furlough days used by the District.
Petitioner has provided no authority to subject the voluntary agreements to subject to Idaho Code
Section 33-513. The intent of the agreements regarding furlough days and the voluntary nature of
those agreements is absolutely clear. These agreements speak for themselves, as there is no
'

'

'

ambiguity or any lack of clarity. The City of Meridian v. Petra Incorporated, 154 Idaho 425, 299
P.3d 232 (2013).
If a Mitten contract is complete upon its face and unambiguous,
and no party alleges any fraud or mistake, "extrinsic evidence of
prior or contemporaneous negotiations or conversations is not
admissible to contradict, vary, alter, add to, or detract from the
·
terms of the contract.''

The City of Meridian, 299 PJd 232, 241, citing Howard v. Perry, 141 Idaho 139, 141, 106 P.3d
465, 467 (2005).
The voluntary agreements with the teachers of the District were not employment
contracts by definition, and were only one of several mechanisms utilized by District to
temporarily aid the significant cash-flow problem.

B.

The Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Bear Lake Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Trs. of
Bear Lake School Dist. No. 33 does not establish standing for- Petitioner.

In its Memorandum in Opposition, Petitioner seeks to establish standing based on the
Idaho Supreme Court's ruling in Bear Lake Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Trs. of Bear Lake School

Dist. No. 33, 116 Idaho 443, 776 P.2d 452 (1989). Bear Lake involved the Bear Lake Education
RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
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Association;s petition to compel the Bear Lake School District Board of Trustees to honor a
provision of the Districts master agreement regarding arbitration of a grievance.

One issue

before the Court was whether the association could assert standing. On review the Idaho
Supreme Court granted the association standing, recognizing that the Bear Lake Education
Association was a party to the master agreement. (Emphasis added).

In Bear Lake, the court dealt with a master agreement executed by the Bear Lake School
District and the Bear Lake Education Association.
The Supreme Court for the State of Idaho looked to the United States Supreme Court for
guidance in defining associational standing, holding:
There is no question that an a<;sociation may have standing in its
own right to seek judicial relief from injury to itself and to
vindicate whatever rights and immunities the association itself may
enjoy. Moreover, in attempting to secure relief from injury to itself
the Association may assert the rights of its members, at least so
long as the challenged infractions adversely affect its members'
associational ties. Id. at 457 (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449 (1958)).

In Bear Lake, the education association's petition involved a member's right to arbitrate
his grievance and the refusal to arbitrate by the district. The right was provided for in the master
agreement. Based upon a clearly defined injury (a refusal to arbitrate), the Idaho Supreme Court
held that the denial of the grievance process adversely affected association member's
associational ties, "since any breach of the master agreement would in turn be injurious to the
association." Bear Lake Educ. Ass'n, 116 Idaho at 457.

In this case before the Court, NEA is not a party to the teacher voluntary addendum
contracts. Additionally, the NBA has failed to provide the Court with any evidence of injury to
itself. or an infraction adversely affecting any of its member's associational ties. The only
evidence before the Court is the Affidavit of Mandy Simpson, which fails to allege any injury to
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herself, any infraction adversely affecting her tie to the NEA as a member, or immediate or
threatened hann.
The Bear Lake Court further held:
The association must allege that its members, or any one of them,
are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the
challenged action of the sort that would make out a justiciable case
had the members themselves brought suit. Bear Lake Educ. Ass 'n
116 Idaho at 457, citing Sierra Club v. Morton 405 U.S. 727, 73441 (1972).
In Bear Lake, the denial of the right to arbitrate created an immedjate injury. Had the iajured

teacher filed individually, a justiciable claim would have then existed. That would be sufficient
under the Bear Lake case to allow the NEA to have standing. However, the NEA has failed to
properly allege that any of its members are or were suffering an immediate or threatened injury
resulting from entering into a voluntary addendum to contribute furlough days.

Lastly, the Bear Lake Court held:
Any injury to an individual teacher \Vithin the Association as a
result of breaching the Master Agreement would in turn be
injurious to the Association. Both the Asso.ciation as a party to the
agreement, and each individual teacher as a member of the
Association, have an interest in having the agreement enforced and
interpreted for this and future relations. Bear Lake Educ. Ass 'n 116
Idaho at 457.
The NEA has failed to provide any evidence to this Court that any individual teacher has
been iajured, or that any member of the NBA has any interest in the requested relief of declaring
the addendum contracts unlawful and unenforceable. Therefore, unlike Bear Lake, there is no
iajury to an individual teacher which would also be injurious to the NEA. The NEA cannot
establish standing under the legal analysis and holding in Bear Lake.
The NEA also fails to establish standing urider Idaho Code. Idaho Code 53-

707, Capacity to Assert and Defend- standing, provides:
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(i) A nonprofit association, in its name. may institute; defend,
intervene or participate in a judicial> administrative or other
governmental proceeding or in an arbitration, mediation or any
other form of alternative dispute resolution.

(2) A nonprofit association may assert a claim in its name on
behalf of its members if one ( 1) or more members of the nonprofit
association have standing to assert a claim in their own righti the
interests the nonprofit association seeks to protect are germane to
its purposes and neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested
requires the participation of a member.
The NEA can only assert a claim in its name on behalf of its members if: ( 1) One or more
members have standing to assert a claim; (2) the interest the NEA seeks to protect is germane to
its purpose; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation
of a member.
The NEA has failed to establish standing as no NBA member can ''allege or demonstrate
an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or
redress the claimed injury." Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 641 778 P.2d 757, 763
( 1989). Since the NEA cannot produce a member with a redressable injury, the NEA does not
have standing under Idaho Code Section 53-707.
The interest sought by the NEA of asking this court to declare that an executed and fullyperformed voluntary agreement, (of which it is not a party to) unlawful or unenforceable is not

germane to the NEA's purpose. Lastly, the claim asserted by the NEA requires the participation
of a member, and at this point, the NEA has failed to provide at least one member to claim such
injury. As a result. the NEA fails to meet its burden under Idaho Code Section 53-707.

C.

Based on Idaho case law, Petitioner's clahn is moot.
The teachers who volunteered to take furlough days without pay and executed the

voluntary addendum contracts have fully performed and taken the furlough days; and, therefore,

no controversy exists.
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Since no controversy exists, and Petitioner)s claim is moot. Petitioner cites the recently
decided case of Bettwieser v. New York Irrigation Dist which held that under Idaho's
Declaratory Judgment Act a trial court's jurisdiction is limited to cases "where an actual or
justiciable controversy exists;; and courts are precluded "from deciding cases which are purely
hypothetical or advisory." Bettwieser v. New York Irrigation Dist.; 154 Idaho 317,297 P.3d 1134
(2013).

Petitioner correctly defines the standard adopted by the court, but arrives at the wrong
conclusion. Bettwieser and other cases cited in Respondent's motion stand for the proposition
that an issue is moot if there is no justiciable controversy. (See Idaho County Property Owners

Ass 'n., Inc. v. Syringa, "an issue is moot if it presents no justiciable controversy and a judicial
determination will have no practical effect on thtfoutcome;'' and Koch v. Idaho County, 145
Idaho 158, 163 177 P.3d 372,377 (2008), '' ... an issue will become moot ifit does not present a
real and substantial controversy that is capable of being concluded by judicial relief/')
The addendum contracts at issue before this Court were voluntary and have now been
completely performed by those teachers who volunteered furlough days. This court is unable to
grant such relief. Id The Court would be required to decide a hypothetical case and/or render an
advisory opinion. There is no authority presented to the court that establishes any violation of a
statute or rule by the District, or to support any determination that the voluntary addendum
contracts were illegal as a matter of law. It would be the position of District that Bettwieser
stands for the proposition that an advisory opinion would be precluded as being moot, and such a
decision is supported by the cases cited above by the District dealing with the issue of mootness.
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Petitioner's claims fail under the Idaho ripeness doctrine.

As provided in this Reply, and in Respondent's Memorandum in Support

its Motion

for Summary Judgment, it is clear to the Respondent that Petitioner has failed to present a

definite and concrete issue as it has failed to submit any evidence to this Court of any injury. Noh

v. Cenarrusa, 137 Idaho 798,801, 53 P.3d 1217, 1220 (2002) (citing Boundary Backpackers v.
Boundary Cnty.• 128 Idaho 371, 376, 913 P.2d 1141, 1146 (1996)). As stated in Respondent's
first Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, there is no real or
substantial controversy in this matter as the voluntary addendum contracts have been fully
executed and performed. Absent an injury and/or a substantial controversy, there is no need for
adjudication, and Petitioner's claim fails under the ripeness doctrine.

CONCLlJSION
Respondenfs Motion for Simrma:ry Judgment should be granted, and Petitioner's Cross
Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied.
Respectfully submitted this 25 th day of July; 2013.

YOST LAW, PLLC

By: _

___,,---..1-__,.__.,,,.,,________
Chip Giles
Attorney for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 25th day of July, 2013, I caused to be served by the method
indicated below a true and correct copy of the foregoing document upon:

Paul J. Stark
Idaho Education Association
620 North 6th St
P0Box2638
Boise, ID 83701

U.S. Mail
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
X Facsimile No. 344M1606

Chip Giles
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Paul J. Stark, Esq.- ISB #5919
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION
6t0 North Sixth Street
P.O. Box 2638
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 333-8560

F I L \:a:5
E DP,M.

_ _ _A.M, '>

JUL 2 5 2013

Facsimile: (208) 344-1606

CANYON COUNTY CLERK
T. CRAWFORD, DEPlJTY

Attomey for Petitioner

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

NAMPA EDUCATION ASSOClATIO:r\-,

Petitioner,

}
)
)

)
vs.
NAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 131,

Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)

Case No.: CV13-2962-C
PETITIONER'S REPLY MEMOl~A.KDUM
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

ARGUMENT

A.

It is Undisputed that the ''Addendum Contracts" Were Not on a Form Approved by
the State Superintendent of Public Instruction and are Therefore, as a Matter of
Law, Illegal.
Respondent has not raised any issue of fact, beyond mere allegations and denials, as to

the issue of whether the addendum contracts were on a form approved by the state
superintendent of public instruction. There is absolutely no evidence in the record whatsoever
that the addendum contracts were so approved. Accordingly, there is no issue of material fact on
this issue and this Court, as a matter of law, should rule that the addendum contracts were
illegal.

PETITIONER'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITI01'.1ER'S MOTION FOR SW,.,lMARY
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Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) set forth the requirements opposing a motion for
summary judgment, providing in pertinent part as follows:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that
party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavit or as otherwise provided
in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial. If the party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be
entered against the party.
Worthen v. State, 96 Idaho 175, 176, 525 P.2d 957,958 (1974); Ambrose v. Buhl Joint School

District No. 412, 126 Idaho 581, 584, 887 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Ct. app. 1995). Two well-respected
commentators on federal summary judgment practice have made clear that a party opposing a
motion for summary judgment may not rely on allegations, assertions or speculation to raise a
genuine issue of material fact; rather, such party must present specific evidence in order to
defend a summary judgment motion. C. Wright. A. Miller & Kane, "Federal Practice &
Procedure: Civil 3d, § 2739 (1998) at pp. 378-389 and cases cited therein; 11 '.Moore's Federal
Practice,§ 56.13[2] and [4] (Matthew Bender 3rd ed. 2001) and cases cite<l therein.
Rather than address the substantive issue of the legality of the addendum contracts,
Respondent instead has chosen to attempt to blur the issue by resting their opposition on a false
theory that the addendum contracts were "voluntary" and therefore a violation of the statute (33513) and the Rule (IDAPA 08.02.01.150) are of no consequence. Indeed, it may be said of
nearly all contracts in Idaho, including the Standard Teacher Contract, that such is entered into
voluntarily. Whether the addendum contract was voluntary or not is a simply a red herring.
There is no "voluntary" exception or qualifier to Idaho Code § 33-513 or IDAPA 08.02.01.150.
The law is clear and unambiguous.

A teacher's employment can only be governed by an

approved form and there can be no deviation from the approved form. Whether Respondent
claims it was voluntary or not is irrelevant to this analysis due to the undisputed fact that there is
PETITIONER'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S MOTI0::--1 FOR Sl}::VfMARY
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no evidence in that record that the addendum contract was ever approved. Further, Respondent

has not at any time even alleged that it was approved.
Moreover, some statutory rights cannot be waived. In this case, it is quite obvious that
the legislature, by enacting the requirement of approved forms in Idaho Code § 33-513, and

prohibiting any unapproved deviations in IDAPA 08.02.01.150, intended to protect teachers
from just the sort of gerrymandering, whether it was voluntary or not. Taking the Respondent's
argument to its logical conclusion, one could equally say that truth in lending laws governing the
actions between a bank and a borrower can be voluntarily waived by a bank drafted addendum
contract. Certainly there exists the same disparity in power between and bank ~md a lender as
there is between a teacher and the School District. The same can be said for protections under
the Fair Labor Standards Act where an employee waives their statutory right to overtime pay
under an addendum contract. Stated simply, there are statutory protections established to protect
individuals that cannot be waived, no matter how strenuous the employee may wish to believe

that the agreement was truly voluntary. That

jg

not the issue. The issue is whether the employer

complied with the clear mandates of the law. In this situation, Respondent did not.

B.

The Nampa Education Association Has Standing to Pursue This Action.
Pursuant to Idaho Supreme Court case law, the Nampa Education Association has

standing to bring this action. Particularly, the case of Bear Lake Educ. Ass 'n v. Board cf Trs. of

Bear Lake Sch. Dist. No. 33, 116 Idaho 443, 776 P.2d 452 (1989) is on point and controlling.
In Bear Lake, the Bear Lake Education Association appealed the granting of summary

judgment in favor of the School District in relation to the School District's refusal to adhere to

PETITIONER'S REPLY ME½ORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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provisions of the Master Agreement. 1 On appeal, the School District contested the standing of

the education association to maintain the action against the schoo] district. These are the exact
same arguments being presented in this case.
The Court in Bear Lake addressed the same arguments being presented in the case at bar.
Respondent's arguments revolve around two premises: First, the Nampa Education Association
has not suffered any injury. In Bear Lake the Court addressed the injury argument and held,
"Any injury to an individual teacher within the Association as a result of breaching the Master
Agreement would in turn be injurious to the Association.'' Id. at 448, 776 P.2d at 457. The
Court went on to declare "Further, as standing often tums on the nature and source of the claim
asserted, the actual or threatened injury may exist solely by virtue of 'statutes creating legaJ
rights."' Id. at 448-49, 776 P.2d at 457-58 (quoting Linda R.S v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614,617
(1973)).
In this case, the Nampa Education Association, much like the Bear Lake Education
Association, has associational standing because an injury to any one of the teachers by the
Respondent's statutory violations, "would in turn be injurious to the Association." Bear Lake,
supra.

Also, the fact that Idaho Code § 33-513 is a statute creating rights (or better yet

protections), this may be the sole basis of actual or threatened injury.
Respondent also contests standing on the part of the Nampa Education Association on an
assertion that any relief would do nothing to prevent future harm or redress current harm.
Respondenf s basis for this argument is that in the time that it has taken to get before this Court

Respondent in its Respondent's Rep(v to Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment (at p. 4) confuse the
Standard Teacher Contract and the Master Agreement. For clarity, a Sta:-idard Teacher Contract is an individual
contract signed by each teacher in every school district in Idaho. The Standard Teacher Contra;,;t incorporates by
reference the terms of the Master Agreement. A Master Agreement (a/k/a Collective Bargaining Agreement) is a
contract negotiated by the local education organization (see Idaho Code §S 33-1272, 1273) on behalf ofall teachers
within the bargafrling unit, both member and non-member of the association.

PETITIONER'S REPLY MEMORMTIUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITIO~R'S MOTION FOR SG'"NIMAR.Y
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the illegal contracts have been fully perfonned, and therefore there is no harm. There is no case

law to support such an assertion. Indeed it would be a grave injustice to allow a statutory
violation to occur and then strike down an attempt to seek judicial relief due to the mere passage
of time.
The Nampa Education Association has an interest in pursuing this claim on behalf of its
members and the non-members it represents not on]y to gain the ability to redress the past
statutory and rule violations (see Idaho Code§ 10-1201), but also to prevent such statutory and

rule violations 1n the future. If the Respondent is allowed 1o violate the statute and rule in 1his
contract year, there is nothing to prevent it from happening again and again.

It is noteworthy that Respondent's arguments in opposition to Petitioner's Motion for
Summary Judgment focus nearly entirely on standing, and avoid the very merits of the claims,
namely the legality or illegality of the addendum contracts.

Accordingly, once the Nampa

Education Association's standing to bring this matter has been established, there is virtually no
assertions or argument on the part of Respondent contradicting the assertion that the statute and
rule relating to teacher contracts have been violated.

Therefore, this Court should grant

Petitioner's motion for summary judgment.

C.

Respondent's Attempt to Distinguish the "Addendum Contract" from an
Employment Contract is Unfounded.
The addendum contract is an agreement that changes the terms and conditions of a

teacher's employment. There can be no dispute that this is an emplo)'IDent contract. Further,
there has been no argument presented contesting the assertion that the addendum contract was
never approved by the state superintendent of public instruction. Further, there is no argument
contradicting the assertion that the Nampa School District Board of Trustees ever approved such

PETITIONER'S REPLY MEMORA1'.'DUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR Sill,lMARY
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addendum contract. In short, in cannot be disputed that the addendum contracts are illegal and
unenforceable.

First, the addendum contracts are indisputably employment contracts as contemplated in
Idaho Code § 33-513.

The addendum contract is titled "Addendum to Continuing Teacher

Contract." See Affidavit of Steve Kipp, Exhibit A. Tue contract is not a standalone contract, but
is an unauthorized contractual modification of the Standard Teacher Contract

The first

''Recital" of the addendum contract provides "District and Teacher entered into a State of Idaho
Continuing Teacher Contract dated_ day of Sept, 2012, for the school year 2012-2013." Id.
Later in paragraph 1 of the addendum contract this Standard Teacher Contract is incorporated
into the addendum contract:
1. INCORPORATION OF RECITALS: 1be above recitals are contractual and
binding and are incorporated herein as if set forth 1n full.

Id.

The addendum contract discusses changes in the number of days that will be worked

(paragraph 2), the term of the agreement is the same as the school year and tenninates at the
same time the Standard Teacher Contract Terminates (paragraph 4), and is signed by the teacher
(employee) and the Chairman of the Nampa School District Board of Trustees (employer). Id.
Moreover, the Human Resource Officer of the Nampa School District "coordinated the
presentation process of the agreements from administration to teachers and personnel." Id. ,i 3.
Despite all this, Respondent now argues that this is not a contract of employment.

Such

arguments are disingenuous and defy the plain language of the document itself
Second, Respondent has not attempted to argue that the addendum contract was on a
form approved by the state superintendent of public instruction, as required. This amounts to a
concession that the addendum contract violates Idaho Code § 33-513. As such, Petitioner's

summary judgment motion must be granted.
PETITIONER'S REPLY MEMORAf'..'DlTh-1 IK SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SurvlMARY
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Third, Respondent has not presented any evidence of the Nampa School District Board of
Trustees approval of these addendum contracts. Idaho law is explicit in the requirement that all
employment decisions can only be made by the Board of Trustees. In Gilmore v. Bonner County

School Dist. No. 82, 132 Idaho 257, 260, 971 P.2d 323, 326 (1999), the Idaho Supreme Court
made it exphcit that employment authority must come from the Board of Trustees.
Under Idaho Code§ 33-501 school districts are governed by a board of tmstees.
The board has the responsibility and exclusive authority to employ both
professional and noncertificated personnel necessary to maintain and operate the
schools in the district. J.C.§ 33-51 l; IC.§ 33-513; J.C.§ 33-517. The board and
the teachers within the school district expect that the board will make employment
decisions and that those decisions will follow the correct statutory procedure.
Brown v. Caldwell School Dist. No. 132, 127 Idaho 112, 898 P .2d 43 ( 1995);
Rhoades v. Idaho Falls School D~st, No,, 91, ql Idaho 827,965 P.2d 187 (1998).
They can rely upon employment decisions made in accordance with those
procedures. Corum v. Common School Dist.. Na. 21, 55 Idaho 725, 47 P.2d 889
(1935).

Id. at 260, 971 P.2d at 326. Since there is no evidence in the record that the Nampa School
District Board of Trustees authorized the addendum contract, in addition to the lack of evidence
of approval by the state superintendent of pub]ic instruction, the addendum contracts are void.
Accordingly, Petitioner's motion for summary judgment should be granted.

C.

Respondent's Objections to the Affidavit of :Mandy Simpson are Without Merit.
The affidavit of Mandy Simpson demonstrates that Ms. Simpson, as both a teacher in the

Nampa School District and as the President of the Namp~ Education Association, has personal
knowledge of the facts contained in her affidavit. Accordingly, Respondent's objections should
be overruled.

Respondent objects to Ms. Simpson's affidavit on the grounds of hearsay, and argues that
such statements are inadmissible. Specifically, Respondent objects to paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 7, 10,
13 and 14. The Idaho Rules of Evidence define hearsay as "a statement, other than one made by
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the dedarant while testifying at the trial o:- hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted." LR.E. 80l(c). Petitioner will address each one of these paragraphs below.

Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 are statements by Ms. Simpson declaring that the Nampa Education
Association was chosen and recognized by the Nampa School District as the exclusive
representative of the teachers in the Nampa School District for the 2012-2013 school year, as it
had been for several decades before. Ms. Simpson established that she is the President of the
Nampa Education Association in paragraph 1 of her affidavit. As President, certainly she can
testify on behalf of the organization she represents. Much like a witness under Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 30(b)(6), Ms. Simpson represents the Nampa Education Association. It is not
hearsay for her to testify as to the status of the Nampa Education Association.

Likewise, paragraphs I 3 deals with Ms. Simpson asking legal counsel to prepare a
correspondence on behalf of the Nampa Education Association to Respondent, and paragraph 14
is a copy of said correspondence. These are not hearsay statements, but matters upon which Ms.
Simpson has direct, first-hand knowledge. If testifying, Ms. Simpson could be subject to cross
examination as to these statements. These are not out-of-court statements by someone other than
Ms. Simpson. The correspondence is not "offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted" (LR.E. 801(c)), but rather a demonstrative evidence of the actions she had requested to
be completed. At the very least, exceptions under Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(6) and (8) would
app]y.

Respondent further objects to paragraphs 7 and 10 of Ms. Simpson's affidavit. What
Respondent does not acknowledge is that Ms. Simpson is not only the President of the
association, representing all members of the bargaining unit, but that she is also a teacher herself
in the Nampa School District.

Idaho Code 33-1272 requires Ms. Simpson to be a teacher in the
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Nampa School District.

As such, she has personal knowledge of the events described in

paragraphs 7 and 10. In paragraph 15 she so testifies. Further, as the President of the exclusive
representative organization of all the teachers, she is required under the Duty of Fair
Representation to communicate with all the teachers within the bargaining lL'lit.

Thus, in

addition to personal knowledge, Ms. Simpson has kno\vledge of what the membership of the
Nampa Education Association and other teachers were experiencing. As the representative of
the association, Ms. Simpson is allowed to testify as to the state of mind of her membership. See
LR.E. 803(3).

For the reasons discussed above, Respondent's objections to the affidavit of Ms. Simpson
should be overruled.

CONCLUSIO~
Based upon the foregoing, Petitioner is entitled to summary judgment on their Petition for
Dec]aratory Judgment.
,\',-'

DATED this "2fS' day of July, 20 l 3.
IDAHO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK
S BROWN, DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

)

NAMPA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,
Petitioner,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)

NAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 131,

)
)
)

Respondent.

)

CASE NO. CV-2013-2962-C

ORDER ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT

-----------)
I.

Factual Background

This case involves no genuine issue of material fact1; instead, the issue is a legal
one. The case arises as a result of the financial difficulties the Nampa School District
faced in the fall of 2012. Earlier that year, the Nampa Education Association (NEA) and
the local Board of Trustees attempted to negotiate the terms of the master employment

1

Pettioners alleged a material fact - that the teachers were pressured or coerced into
signing the addendum contracts. However, as held below, the Court has stricken the
portions of the affidavit that provide the factual support for those allegations for hearsay
reasons. As such, there is no longer any factual allegation regarding the voluntariness
of the contract, nor is a review of the voluntariness issue necessary to determine
whether the addendum contract is illegal on the grounds articulated by the parties.
ORDER ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT- Pg. 1
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contracts for the teachers of the Nampa School District.

Contract negotiations were

unsuccessful and as a result, no master contract was formalized and the contract salary
amount in the Continuing Teachers Contract reflected the "last best offer" of the district.
The Continuing Teachers Contracts (Contract) complied with the State Board of
Education requirements in all respects and the teachers began teaching pursuant to
those contracts in the Fall of 2012.
Thereafter, the Nampa School District faced significant budget shortfalls. The
Nampa School District Superintendent, through the District's human resource officer,
drafted an Addendum to Continuing Teacher Contract (Addendum). Neither the local
Board of Trustees nor the Nampa Education Association (NEA) negotiated the terms of
this Addendum. The parties agree, although for different reasons, that the Addendum
Contract does not comply with I.C. § 33-513. The Addendum requests each individual
teacher donate one to four furlough days for which the teacher would not receive any
compensation but the accrual or availability of benefits would not be affected. These
Addendum Contracts were presented to the teachers through meetings at the various
schools through the school district human resource officer. The Addendum states that
any contribution of furlough days is voluntary on the part of the teacher.

Some,

although it is not clear how many or what percentage, of the teachers agreed to furlough
various numbers of days. After signing the initial Addendum Contract, some teachers
increased or decreased the number of days they had initially agreed to furlough.
The NEA, the Petitioner in this case, then sent two separate letters to the Nampa
School District Superintendent, advising him that from the Petitioner's perspective,
these contracts were illegal because: 1) the contracts amount to illegal direct dealing
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between the district and the individual teachers; 2) the Petitioner, not individual
teachers, was the negotiating body for the teachers; and, 3) the contracts were not on a
form approved by the State Board of Education, in violation of Idaho Code§ 33-513(1 ). 2
The district did not respond and thereafter, the contracts were executed and the
furlough days were completed. At the time Petitioner instituted the above-entitled action
asking this Court to declare the contracts illegal as a matter of law, the Addendum
Contracts had been fully executed and the furlough days had already been applied.
Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The Plaintiff's motion included
the affidavit of Mandy Simpson, the president of the NEA at the time the Continuing
Teacher Contracts and Addendum Contracts were executed.

The Respondent has

objected to various paragraphs of Ms. Simpson's Affidavit on hearsay grounds.

II.

Motion to Strike

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) provides in pertinent part: "[s]upporting and
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to testify to the matters stated therein." These requirements "are not satisfied
by an affidavit that is conclusory, based on hearsay, and not supported by personal

2

Of note, two different sets of statutes are applicable in this case. At the time the
Continuing Teachers Contracts were executed, the "Students Come First" legislation
was in effect. However, following the election in November 2012, those sections of the
law were repealed by the voters and formalized by the Governor on November 8, 2012.
Consequently, the Addendum Contract is governed by different law than the Continuing
Teacher Contract, although the change in the law does not affect the outcome of the
case.
ORDER ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT- Pg. 3
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knowledge." Posey v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 141 Idaho 477,483,111 P.3d 162, 168
(Ct App. 2005)( citing State v. Sha ma Res. Ltd. P'ship, 127 Idaho 267, 271, 899 P.2d

977, 981 (1995)). Further, when considering evidence presented in support of or
opposition to a motion for summary judgment, a court can only consider material which
would be admissible at trial. Gem State Ins. Co. v. Hutchison, 145 Idaho 10, 14, 175
P.3d 172, 176 (2007)(citing Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal, Co., 92 Idaho 865, 869,
452 P.2d 362, 366 (1969)). Thus, if the admissibility of evidence presented in support of
a motion for summary judgment is raised by objection by one of the parties, the court
must first make a threshold determination as to the admissibility of the evidence "before
proceeding to the ultimate issue, whether summary judgment is appropriate." Id. at 14,
176 (citations omitted).
In this case, the objectionable portions of Ms. Simpson's affidavit are:
Paragraph 2: The Nampa Education Association was duly chosen as the
representative organization of the teachers within the Nampa School District for the
2013-2013 school year.
Paragraph 3: The Nampa Education Association was recognized by the Nampa
School District as the representative organization of the teachers within the Nampa
School District for the 2012-2013 school year.
Paragraph 4: the Nampa Education Association has been duly chosen and
recognized as the representative organization of the teachers within the Nampa School
District for the past several decades.
Paragraph 7: On or about the week of December 10, 2012, the Nampa School
District began pressuring teachers to sign an addendum contract by requiring teachers
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to attend mandatory "emergency" meetings where the addendum contract was
presented.
Paragraph 8: Attached as Exhibit "B'' and incorporated by this reference is a true
and correct copy of the form addendum contract (for both continuing and category A
contracts).
Paragraph 9: Many teachers were told that the addendum contracts had to be
signed and returned within a matter of a few days (December 1th).
Paragraph 10: Many teachers felt pressured to sign the addendum contracts by
the Nampa School District and did not consider it voluntary. These teachers expressed
fear of retaliation should then not sign the addendum contracts or if they were to
publically [sic] state that the contracts were not voluntarily signed.
Paragraph 13: During the week of December 10, 2012, where teachers were
being pressured to sign the addendum contracts, I directed legal counsel to draft a letter
to the Nampa School District Explaining the situation.
Paragraph 14: Attached as Exhibit "C" and incorporated by this reference is a
true and correct copy of a December 14, 2012 letter from Paul Stark to Dr. Thomas
Michaelson, Superintendent of the Nampa School District.
Paragraph 153 : As the high pressure tactics continued, I again directed legal
couns8el to draft a second letter to the Nampa School District to explain the situation.

3

The Court asked why the Respondent did not object to the first phrase of Paragraph
15 given its other objections. The Respondent indicated it did also object to the
beginning phrase of Paragraph 15.
ORDER ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT- Pg. 5
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Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 8
Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 8 and 14 are all offered for the truth of the matter asserted that NEA was, and has been for some time, the exclusive negotiating entity for the
teachers in the Nampa School District. The Affiant, Ms. Simpson, does not provide a
factual basis for how she knows this information - whether she has that knowledge as a
result of her status as the President of the Association or whether she gleaned that
information from conversations with others. Regardless, the parties all agreed to these
facts at oral argument so any objection is mooted by the Respondent's subsequent
acceptance and acknowledgement of these facts.

Similarly, although the Addendum

Contract would be hearsay for which no exception has been offered, all of the parties
agree that the Addendum Contract submitted is a true and accurate copy, and both
parties have submitted the document and asked the Court to consider it, as it is the
subject matter of the underlying action.
As such, the Court will not strike Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 8 of Ms. Simpson's
affidavit.

Paragraph 7, 9, 10, 13, and 15
Paragraphs 7, 9, 10 and the first phrase of Paragraphs 13 and 15 are hearsay for
which no exception has been offered. While Ms. Simpson indicates she has "personal
knowledge" of the facts, it is not clear how she obtained that knowledge and therefore,
Plaintiff's have not established sufficient foundation establishing that information as
admissible evidence. As such, paragraphs, 7, 9, 10, the portion of paragraph 13, being
with the word "During" and ending with the word "contracts," and the first phrase of
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paragraph 15 will be stricken from the affidavit and will not be considered by this Court
for purposes of the Motions for Summary Judgment.
Paragraph 14
Finally, the fact of sending of the letter as outlined in Paragraph 14 is not
hearsay, and the Court will consider that the letter was sent. The contents of the letter,
without adequate foundation, are hearsay.

Ms. Simpson has not provided any

information in her affidavit about how she knows this letter is the same as the letter sent
to the district, therefore, there is insufficient foundation to consider the letter except as
hearsay and thus, the Court will grant the Respondent's motion and will strike that
Portion of Paragraph 15 that relates to the content of Exhibit C.

Ill.

Justiciability
A. Standing

Respondent argues that Plaintiff has not established standing and that the issue is
moot since the contracts have been fully executed. While an association may have
standing in its own right, it must establish an injury to itself to justify any relief. GlengaryGamlin Protective Ass'n, Inc. v. Bird, 106 Idaho 84, 87, 675 P.2d 344, 347 (Ct. App.
1983). (Ct. App. 1983) citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 515, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2213
(1975).
The three most basic propositions of the doctrine of standing that our
Court uses to guide its decisions were outlined in Boundary Backpackers
v. Boundary County as being (1) that standing "focuses on the party
seeking relief and not on the issues the party wishes to have adjudicated;"
(2) that in order "to satisfy the case or controversy requirement of
standing, litigants generally must allege or demonstrate an injury in fact
and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or
redress the claimed injury;" and (3) that "a citizen and taxpayer may not
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challenge a governmental enactment where the injury is one suffered alike
by all citizens and taxpayers of the jurisdiction."
128 Idaho 371, 375, 913 P.2d 1141, 1145 (1996) (quoting Miles v. Idaho Power Co.,
116 Idaho 635, 641, 778 P.2d 757, 763 (1989)). Standing may be predicated upon
either a threatened harm or a past injury. In re Jerome Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 153 Idaho
298, 308, 281 P.3d 1076, 1086 (2012) citing Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 772,
133 P.3d 1232, 1237 (2006). "There is no question that an association may have
standing in its own right to seek judicial relief from injury to itself and to vindicate
whatever rights and immunities the association itself may enjoy. Bear Lake Educ. Ass'n,

By & through Belnap v. Bd. of Trustees of Bear Lake Sch. Dist. No. 33, 116 Idaho 443,
448, 776 P.2d 452,457 (1989).
The only injury alleged in the Petition is that the Addendum was not on a form
approved by the State Board of Education. The Memoranda, both in opposition to the
Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, and in Support of the Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment, reference Idaho Code § 33-513(1) and the public policy reasons
that such an Addendum is, in essence, part of the contract for employment.
In order to establish standing based on a statutory violation, the Petitioner must
show "a direct nexus between the vindication of [its] interest and the enforcement of the
[statute]," Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614,619, 93 S. Ct. 1146, 1149, 35 L. Ed.
2d 536 (1973), in order to insure that "the relief requested would redress appellant's
claimed injury." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S.
167,203, 120 S. Ct. 693, 716, 145 L. Ed. 2d 610 (U.S.S.C. 2000).
In this case, the association has asserted as injury the District's failure to comply
with Idaho Code § 33-513.

At the time the Continuing Teacher Contracts and the
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Addendum were executed, the Petitioner was "the sole representative of the teacher
employees of the District and is the medium through which individual teachers
collectively seek to reach first a negotiation agreement and later a Master Agreement
with the Board of Trustees of [Nampa] School District." Bear Lake Educ. Ass'n, By &

through Belnap v. Bd. of Trustees of Bear Lake Sch. Dist. No. 33, 116 Idaho 443, 448,
776 P.2d 452, 457 (1989).

Although a Master Contract was never formalized, the

negotiation of wage or compensation contracts, and insistence that local boards comply
with §33-513, is still within the exclusive province of the Petitioner and therefore, a
contract purporting to affect wage and compensation would be injurious to Petitioner if it
was not properly negotiated.

As such, Petitioner has an interest in ensuring that

contracts entered into between the teachers and the local board comply with statutory
requirements. In this case, a declaration that the Addendum Contract is illegal would
adequately redress Petitioner's injury - that the contract fails to comply with I.C. § 33513. As such, the Petitioners have established standing in this case. 4

In order to establish standing on behalf of its members, the Organization must
establish all three of the following elements: "(a) its members would otherwise have
standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the
organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted, nor the relief requested,
requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit." Id. at 88, 675 P.2d at
348. When an association seeks standing for its members, the association must allege
that at least one of its members face injury and could meet the requirements of standing
on an individual basis. In re Jerome Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 153 Idaho 298, 308, 281
P.3d 1076, 1086 (2012), citing Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass'n, Inc. v. State ex rel. Andrus,
127 Idaho 239, 241-42, 899 P.2d 949, 951-52 (1995).
"As the record does not
include any indication that Friends of Minidoka had a member who was an affected
party suffering potential harm to real estate in the area surrounding the proposed LCO
site, Friends of Minidoka cannot meet the first requirement for associational standing-no
member has standing to sue in their own right." Id. at 298, 281 P.3d at 1088.
Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to assert standing on behalf of its
individual members. Unlike the organizations in In re Jerome County Bd. of Com'rs, in
this case, there is nothing in the Record that lists or otherwise indicates the membership
4
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B. Mootness
The Respondent argues that the issue in this case is moot because the contracts
have been fully executed and therefore, no relief is available. Petitioners argue that the
relief requested can be granted through the declaration and thus, the issue is not moot.
The general rule of mootness doctrine is that, to be justiciable, an issue must
present a real and substantial controversy that is capable of being concluded through a
judicial decree of specific relief. Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Idaho State
Bd. of Educ., 128 Idaho 276, 281-82, 912 P.2d 644, 649-50 (1996).
Furthermore, the controversy must be live at the time of the court's hearing. Id. at
282, 912 P.2d at 650. If, however, the issues presented are no longer live and if the
parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome, those issues are not justiciable,
but are moot and thereby preclude review. Id. at 281, 912 P.2d at 649. A party lacks a
legally cognizable interest in the outcome when even a favorable judicial decision would
not result in relief. See Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481-82, 102 S.Ct. 1181, 1183, 71
L.Ed.2d 353, 356-57 (1982). Freeman v. Idaho Dep't of Correction, 138 Idaho 872, 875,
71 P.3d 471, 474 (Ct. App. 2003).
"An action for declaratory judgment is moot where the judgment, if granted,
would have no effect either directly or collaterally on the plaintiff, the plaintiff would be
unable to obtain further relief based on the judgment and no other relief is sought in the
action." Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity By & Through Eikum v. Idaho State Bd.
of the Plaintiff organization included any one of the teachers who signed the Addendum
Contract. If the Petitioner had alleged and supported by facts that any one of its
members signed the Addendum Contract, then it would have met the first prong of the
test. However, failing to specifically allege that an identified member of the association
has suffered, or will suffer, an injury deprives the Plaintiff organization of standing on
this basis.
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of Educ. By & Through Mossman, 128 Idaho 276, 282, 912 P.2d 644, 650 (1996), citing

22A Am.Jur.2d Declaratory Judgments § 41 (1988). The existence of the required
elements for declaratory relief, including the existence of a "controversy," should be
determined as of the time of the court's trial or hearing, rather than at the
commencement of the action. See, e.g., Golden v. Zwick/er, 394 U.S. 103, 108, 89 S.Ct.
956, 959, 22 L.Ed.2d 113 (1969)."
In this case, Petitioner has not asked for any relief except to have the contracts
declared illegal. However, if the relief asked for is granted, that declaration would have
an effect -

either directly or collaterally -

as Petitioner can thereafter use the

declaration, if granted, to prevent future types of contracts.

Additionally, if the

Addendum Contract is determined to be illegal, Petitioner could seek further relief on
behalf of its members. As such, although the contracts have been fully executed, the
issue is not moot.

IV.

Motion for Summary Judgment

Under l.R.C.P. 56(c), the Plaintiff shall be entitled to summary judgment if the
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 716 P.2d 1238 (1986). In
determining whether an issue of material fact exists, all disputed facts are liberally
construed and all reasonable inferences made in favor of the non-moving party. G&M
Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 808 P/2d 851 (1991).

If the record

contains conflicting inferences upon which reasonable minds could differ, summary
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judgment should not be granted. Sewell v. Neilson Monroe, Inc., 109 Idaho 192, 706
P.2d 81 (Ct.App.1985). This requirement is a strict one. Clarke v Prenger, 114 Idaho
766, 760 P .2d 1182 ( 1988). The burden of proving the absence of a material fact rests
at all times upon the moving party. G&M Farms v Funk, supra. This burden is onerous
because even "circumstantial evidence can create a genuine issue of material fact."
Doe v Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 716 P.2d 1238 (1986).
Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue, the burden
shifts to the nonmoving party to show that a genuine issue of material fact on the
challenged element of their claim does exist. Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(e); Kiebert v. Goss,
144 Idaho 225, 228, 159 P.3d 862, 865 (2007); Navarrete v. City of Caldwell, 130 Idaho
849, 949 P.2d 597 (Ct.App.1997). The opposing party's case must not rest on mere
speculation because a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine
issue of fact. G&M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., supra; Callies v. O'Neal, 147 Idaho
841,846,216 P.3d 130,135 (2009). If the Plaintiff fails to submit evidence to establish
an essential element of his claim, summary judgment is appropriate. Post Falls Trailer
Park v. Fredekind, 131 Idaho 634, 962 P.2d 1018 (1998). Moreover, a party against
whom a motion for summary judgment is sought may not merely rest on allegations
contained in his pleadings, but must come forward and produce evidence by way of
deposition or affidavit to contradict the assertions of the moving party and establish a
genuine issue of material fact. Sammis v. Magnetek, Inc., 130 Idaho 342,941 P.2d 314
(1997);

See also I.R.C.P. 56(c).

Failure to do so will result in an order granting

summary judgment. The district court is not required to search the record for evidence
of an issue of material fact; it is the nonmoving party's burden to bring that evidence to
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the court's attention. Vreeken v. Lockwood, Eng'g, B. V., 148 Idaho 89, 103-04, 218 P.3d
1150, 1164-65 (2009).

Failure to do so will result in an order granting summary

judgment. Sammis v. Magnetek, Inc., 130 Idaho 342, 941 P.2d 314 (1997).
The fact that both parties file motions for summary judgment does not
necessarily mean that there are no genuine issues of material fact. Moss
v. Mid-Am. Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 103 Idaho 298,302,647 P.2d 754, 758
(1982). Moreover, the filing of cross-motions for summary judgment does
not transform "the court, sitting to hear a summary judgment motion, into
the trier of fact." Id. When cross-motions have been filed and the action
will be tried before the court without a jury, however, the court may, in
ruling on the motions for summary judgment, draw probable inferences
arising from the undisputed evidentiary facts. Riverside Dev. Co. v.
Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 519, 650 P.2d 657, 661 (1982); see also Drew v.
Sorensen, 133 Idaho 534, 537, 989 P.2d 276, 279 (1999). Drawing
probable inferences under such circumstances is permissible since the
court, as the trier of fact, would be responsible for resolving conflicting
inferences at trial. Ritchie, 103 Idaho at 519, 650 P.2d at 661. Conflicting
evidentiary facts, however, must still be viewed in favor of the nonmoving
party. Argyle v. Slemaker, 107 Idaho 668, 670, 691 P.2d 1283, 1285
(Ct.App.1984).

Banner Life Ins. Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 147 Idaho 117, 123-24,
206 P.3d 481, 487-88 (2009). When both parties file a motion for summary judgment
relying upon the same facts, issues, and theories, the parties essentially stipulate that
there is no genuine issue of material fact which would preclude the district court from
entering summary judgment. Brown v. Perkins, 129 Idaho 189,191,923 P.2d 434,436
(1996). Hunting v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 161, 129 Idaho 634, 637, 931 P.2d 628,
631 (1997).
At issue in this case is whether the Addendum Contract is a contract pursuant to
I.C. § 33-513(1 ), which provides in pertinent part:
The board of trustees of each school district, including any specially
chartered district, shall have the following powers and duties:
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1 To employ professional personnel, on written contract in form
approved by the state superintendent of public instruction.
Petitioners assert that this contract was an employment contract, but that it was not on
an approved form as required by statute and therefore, was an illegal contract.
Respondents argue that it was not an employment contract and therefore, was not
required to be on any approved form and, consequently, is perfectly legal. Both parties
agree that the Continuing Teachers Contract complied with Idaho Code § 33-513 and
that the Addendum Contract was an "Addendum to Continuing Teacher Contract."
Whether a contract is illegal is a question of law for the court to determine from
all the facts and circumstances of each case. Trees v. Kersey, 138 Idaho 3, 6, 56 P.3d
765, 768 (2002). The illegality of a contract can be raised at any stage in litigation. Id. In
fact, the court has the duty to raise the issue of illegality sua sponte. Id. Whether a
contract violates a statute is a question of statutory interpretation and is a matter of law
for the Court to determine from all the facts and circumstances of each case. Id ..
Statutory interpretation begins with the literal language of the statute.
Paolini v. Albertson's, Inc., 143 Idaho 547, 549, 149 P.3d 822, 824 (2006).
The statute should be considered as a whole, and words should be given
their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings. Id. When the statutory language
is unambiguous, the plain meaning of the statute must be given effect, and
the court need not consider rules of statutory construction. Payette River
Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Valley County, 132 Idaho 551,
557, 976 P.2d 477, 483 (1999). It should be noted that the court must give
effect to all the words and provisions of the statute so that none will be
void, superfluous, or redundant. AmeriTel Inns, Inc. v. PocatelloChubbuck Auditorium Dist., 146 Idaho 202, 204, 192 P.3d 1026, 1028
(2008).

Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint Sch. Dist. No. 401, 147 Idaho 277, 282, 207 P.3d 1008,
1013 (2009).

ORDER ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Pg. 14

A contract made for the purpose of furthering any matter prohibited by statute is
illegal, unenforceable, and void. Kunz v. Lobo Lodge, Inc., 133 Idaho 608, 611, 990
P.2d 1219, 1222 (Ct.App.1999) (citing Porter v. Canyon County Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins.
Co., 45 Idaho 522, 525, 263 P. 632, 633 (1928)). When a court is faced with an illegal
contract, it denies enforcement of the contract. Trees, 138 Idaho at 9, 56 P.3d at 771.
According to Black's Law Dictionary: addendum is "a thing that is added." To
employ means "to engage in one's service; to hire." To hire "implies a request and a
contract for compensation."
In this case, Respondent's conceded at oral argument that the Addendum
Contract was part of the employment contract and it attempted to, and in fact, did,
modify the Contract by reducing the amount of compensation agreed upon in the
Contract.

Employment contracts are required to be on a form approved by the state

superintendent of public instruction pursuant to I.C. § 33-513.

This Addendum

purported to reduce the compensation afforded to the teachers and to remove the
protections of I.C. § 33-513 without any indication that it did so in a form approved by
either the State Superintendent of Public Instruction or the State Board of Education.
Therefore, the Addendum Contract is ineffective at altering the terms of the Continuing
Teacher Salaries and is void.
On a separate ground, this Court finds the Addendum Contract is illegal because
it failed to comply with Idaho Code§§ 33-1272 and -1273. Various Idaho Code sections
are relevant to this analysis:
I.C. § 33-1272(3) provides in pertinent part:
negotiations means meeting and conferring ... by the local board of
trustees and the authorized local education organization or the respective
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designated representatives of both parties for the purpose of reaching an
agreement upon matters and conditions subject to negotiations as
specified in a negotiation agreement between said parties.
Section 33-1272(1) defines a professional employee as a "certificated employee," which
includes teachers and I.C. § ;33-1273(1) requires that:
"the local education organization selected by a majority of the qualifying
professional employees shall be the exclusive representative for all
professional employees in the district for purposes of negotiations. A local
board of trustees or its designated representative shall negotiate matters
covered by a negotiations agreement only with the local education
organization or its designated representative.
Finally, Idaho Admin. Code r. 08.02.01 .150: states, 'The State Superintendent of Public
Instruction has approved a standard employment contract form. Any deviation from this
contract form must be approved by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction and
reviewed for reapproval once every three (3) years. (Section 33-513, Idaho Code) (4-197).
There is a complex set of statutory provisions governing the process by which
teachers' salaries, benefits and employment conditions are negotiated.

"... [T]he

procedures set forth in I.C. §§ 33-1271 to -1276 reflect the legislature's determination
that structured negotiation procedures would benefit not only school districts and
teachers, but the public as well. Gilbert v. Nampa Sch. Dist. No. 131, 104 Idaho 137,
147,657 P.2d 1, 11 (1983).
At oral argument, both parties agreed that the number of working days and the
commensurate salary are issues usually negotiated by the local board and the
education association.
superintendent human

Here there was an agreement apparently between the school
resource

officer and

individual teachers.

The school

superintendent, individually or through the human resource officer, did not have the
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statutory authority to negotiate a reduced salary or wages unless he was designated by
the local board of trustees but even so, the designee of the local board can only
negotiate matters covered by the negotiation agreement with the local education
organization or its designee.
Here, the school superintendent, in presenting individual teachers with a variety
of days, and allowing teachers to select a specific number of days to furlough and then
to subsequently modify the number of agreed-upon furlough days, was negotiating with
individual teachers regarding the compensation each teacher would forego based on
the number of days the teacher agreed to furlough.

This negotiation is specifically

precluded under the statute. Moreover, the superintendent is deemed to know that the
individual teachers had no authority to negotiate in this fashion and thus, he
superintendent had no justifiable reason to believe the individual teachers had the
authority to enter into contracts that altered their wage or compensation when such
contract was negotiated outside the statutory process. Brown v. Caldwell Sch. Dist. No.
132,127 Idaho 112, 117-118, 898 P.2d 43, 48049 (1995).
Because the individual teachers entering the contracts did not have the authority
to contract for reduced wages or compensation when such reduction was negotiated
outside the statutory procedure, there was a lack of authority to contract, rendering the
Addendum Contracts void. 146 Idaho 527 (2008) citing Woodward v. City of
Grangeville, 13 Idaho 652 (1907).
As such, because the Addendum Contracts do not comply with I.C. §§ 33-513 or
33-1272 and -1273, this Court finds the Addendum Contracts are unenforceable and
therefore, grants Petitioner's motion for summary judgment.
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THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that Petitioner's Motion for Summary
Judgment is GRANTED and Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

Dated: August

\v , 2013.

M 1lyJ. Huy District Judge
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OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
NAMPA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,
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TO:

THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, NAMPA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,
AND ITS ATTORNEY OF RECORD, PAUL J. STARK; AND
THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN TH.AT:
1.

The above-named Appellant, NAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 131, appeals

against the above-named Respondent, NAMPA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, to the Idaho
Supreme Court from the Order on Summary Judgment entered on the 16th day of August, 2013, the
Honorable Molly J. Huskey presiding.
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2.

Appellant has the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Order

described in paragraph 1 is appealable, pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 1l(a)(l). See Goodman Oil
Co. v. Scotty's Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc. 148 Idaho 588,591,226 P.3d 530,533 (2010).

3.

In the event the Idaho Supreme Court finds the Order is not appealable pursuant to

Idaho Appellate Rule 11 (a)(l ), Appellant requests, pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 17(2), that this
appeal becomes valid upon the filing and placing of the stamp of the Clerk of the Court on such
appealable judgment or order, without re-filing this Notice of Appeal.
4.

Appellant intends to assert a number of issues, including but not limited to the

following:
a.

Did the District Court err in finding that the negotiation of wages or

compensation and the compliance with Idaho Code Section 33-513 was within the specific
purview of the Nampa Education Association ("NEA"), notwithstanding the fact that there
was no master agreement existing between the NEA and Nampa School District No. 131
("Nampa")?
b.

Did the District Court err in finding that a contract purporting to affect wage

and compensation, if not properly negotiated, would be injurious to the NEA?
c.

Did the District Court err in finding that the NEA had an interest in ensuring

that all voluntary addendum contracts entered into between teachers and local school boards
comply with Idaho Section 33-513?
d.

Did the District Court err in finding that a declaration determining the

voluntary addendum contracts were illegal would adequately redress any injury suffered by
the NEA?
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e.

Did the District Court err in finding that a declaration determining the

voluntary addendum contracts were illegal would have an effect, either directly or
collaterally, as the NEA could prevent future use of such contracts?
f.

Did the District Court err in finding that a declaration determining the

voluntary addendum contracts were illegal would allow the NEA to seek further relief on
behalf of its members?
g.

Did the District Court err in finding that the NEA had standing to bring a

petition for summary judgment?
h.

Did the District Court err in finding that the full performance of the

voluntary addendum contracts did not render the matter moot?
1.

Did the District Court err in finding that the voluntary addendum contracts

were void as a matter oflaw for failure to comply with Idaho Code Section 33-513?
J.

Did the District Court err in finding that the voluntary addendum contracts

were ineffective at altering the terms of continuing salaries (continuing contract salaries)
and, therefore, were void?
k.

Did the District Court err in finding that Nampa, in requesting teachers to

volunteer furlough days, was "negotiating" with individual teachers and such action was
precluded by statute?

1.

Did the District Court err in finding the voluntary addendum contracts to be

illegal for failure to comply with Idaho Code Section 33-1272, et seq.?
m.

Did the District Court err in finding that the Superintendent of Nampa was

deemed to have knowledge that individual teachers had no authority to volunteer furlough
days for the benefit of Nampa?
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n.

Did the District Court err in finding that individual teachers had no authority

to volunteer furlough days, and, therefore, the voluntary addendum contracts were void as a
matter of law?
5.

Appellant requests the reporter's standard transcript from the hearing on Appellant's

Motion for Summary Judgment and Respondent's cross-Motion for Summary Judgment held on
August 1, 2013.
6.

Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the Clerk's record, in

addition to those automatically included under Idaho Appellate Rule 28:
a.

Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support of

Motion for Summary Judgment;
b.

Affidavit of Steve Kipp in Support of Appellant's Motion for Summary

Judgment;
c.

Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support

of Motion for Summary Judgment;
d.

Affidavit of Mandy Simpson m Support of Respondent's Motion for

Summary Judgment;
e.

Appellant's Reply Memorandum to Respondent's Motion for Summary

Judgment;
f.

Respondent's Memorandum m Opposition to Appellant's Motion for

Summary Judgment;
g.

Appellant's Reply to Respondent's Memorandum m Opposition to

Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment;
h.

Respondent's Reply Memorandum in Support of Respondent's Motion for

Summary Judgment.
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7.

No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.

8.

No additional charts or pictures offered or admitted as exhibits are requested in this

9.

It is certified:

appeal.

a.

That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the court reporter,

Laura Whiting, at the following address:
Laura Whiting, Court Reporter
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, ID 83605
b.

That the Clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee of

$200.00 for preparation of the reporter's transcript, subject to adjustments or receipt from
the Clerk's office of an estimate of cost;
c.

That the estimated fee for the preparation of the Clerk's record in the amount

of $100.00 has been paid, subject to adjustment or receipt from the Clerk's office of an
estimate of cost;
d.

That the appellate filing fee of $109.00 has been paid;

e.

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to

Idaho Appellate Rule 20.
DATED this 27th day of September, 2013.
YOST LAW, PLLC

/;_;---_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
By: ___
Chip Giles
Attorneys for Respondent-Appellant
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D

_____ P.M.

0
NAMPA EDUCATION ASSOCfATION,

CANYON COUNTY
T RANDALL,

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner-Respondent,
V.

NAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 131,
Respondent-Appellant.

ORDER REMANDING TO DISTRICT
COURT
Supreme Court Docke1 No. 41454-2013
Canyon County No. 2013-2962

This appeal is from the ORDER ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT file stamped in the District
Court on August 16, 2013.

It appears that a Judgment as required by Idaho Rules of Civil

Procedure 54(a) has yet to be entered. Therefore,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 11 (a\ l '.LL and

17(e)(2), the above-entitled matter be, and hereby is, REMANDED TO THE DISTRICT COURT
and proceedings in this appeal shall be SUSPENDED to allow for the entry of a FINAL
JUDGMENT. Upon entry of the FTNAL JUDGMENT by the District Coun, the District Court
Clerk is directed to transmit a certified copy of the FINAL JUDGMENT to this Court. at which
time this appeal shall proceed accordingly.
h
DATED this
day of October, 2013.

_11!..

For the Supreme Court

Stephe~ W. Kcny~, Clerk
cc:

Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk

District Court Reporter
District Court Judge

ORDER REMANDING TO DISTRICT COURT Docket No. 41454-2013
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L I/~flQ
..
F \_,.A.M./VU'

---

t"',IVI.

OCT \ 7 201!

"'1,,,i!RK
CANYON COUNTY
·
~ .....

c.oVE,OiPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

NAMPA EDUACATION ASSOCIATION,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner,
vs.

NAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 131,

CASE NO.

CV-2013-2962

FINAL JUDGMENT

Respondent.
_________________

Pursuant to the Order on Summary Judgment issued on August 16, 2013:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that judgment is entered in
favor of Petitioner, which is granted the declaratory relief that the Addendum Contracts are
determined to be unlawful and unenforceable.
Dated this

-i'Y"
1'O
day of October, 2013.

FINAL JUDGMENT

1

000125

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was forwarded
to the following persons on this ffaay of October, 2013:

Paul J. Stark
Idaho Education Association
620 N. 6 th Street
Boise, ID 83 702

William F. Yost
Chip Giles
Yost Law, PLLC
4 Ogden Ave.
Nampa, ID 83653

Depu~

FINAL JUDGMENT

2

;_,~--- ,1,,_,,_,J._,,_,..J_

L E D

A.M, _ _ _ _ P.M

NOV O1 2013
CANYON COUNTY CLERK
J HEIDEMAN, DEPUTY

William F. Yo~t, ISB No 1242
Chip Giles, TSB No. 9135

YOST LAW, PLLC
4 Ogden Avenue
PO Box 1275
Nampa, ID 83653
Telephone:
208-466-9222
Facsimile:
208-466-1981

Email:

bud(a)wyostlaw.<:om
chm@iwyostlaw.com

Attorneys for Respondent-Appellant

IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTR1CT

Of' THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

NAMPA EDl1CATION ASSOCIATION,

}

) Case No. CV 2013-2962-C
)
) AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

Petitioner-Respondent,
vs.

)
)
)

NAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 131,

)
)

Respondent-Appellant.

TO:

THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, NAMPA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,
AND ITS ATTORNEY OF RECORD, PAUL J. STARK; AND
THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
l.

The above-named Appellant, NA.MP A SCHOOL DISTRJCT NO. 131, appeals

against the above-named Respondent, NAJvlPA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, to the Idaho
Supreme Court from the Order on Summary Judgment entered on the 16°1 day of August> 2013., the

Honorable Molly J. Huskey presiding.

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1

0001.27

2.

Appellant has the right to appeal to the fdaJ-10 Supreme Court frc,m the Final

Judgment entered by the Distric1 Court on October 17, 2013, puNllUll to Idah.1 Appellate Rtlle

l l(a)(l), Appealab!e Judg1nent'.i and Orders.
3.

Appellant intends to assert a number of i~sues, including but not limited to the

follo"ving:
,,.

Did the District Cou:rr err m finding thar the negotiation of wages or

compensatkm and tbe compli.ance with ldah() Code Section 3:1-513 was within the specific
purview of the Nampa Edtication AssodatH.111 CNEA"), notwithstanding the fact that thtre
w&S

no master agreement existing between the NEA a..+-id Nampa Sch()t)l Dif.trict No. 131

("Nampa")?
h

Did the District Court err in finding that a contract purporting to affect wage

and compensation, if wt properly negotiated, would be injurious to the NE.A?

c.

Did the District Court err in finding that the NEA had an interest in easuring

tha1 all voh.1.ntary addendum contracts entered into beh-v,;en teachers and local school boards
comply with Ida!.}) Section 33-513?

cL

Did rlie District Court err in finding that a dedaraticm ddemiin.ing the:

voluntary addendum contracts -,vere illegal \vo,;ld adequately redress a:1y injury suffered by
theNEA?
e.

Did the Di:,,trict Court err m finding drnt a declaration detemun.ing the

volunt:try addendum contracts were illegal '.\mud have an etfoct, tither directly or

collaterally, as the NEA co .tld prevent future usi; of such contracts?
1

f

Did the District Court err m finding that a declaration determining th;;'

voluntary adJendum contrite ts were illegal would :;illow the NEA to teek further rdief on

behalf of its members?

A.ML!-,;DED NOllCS OF APPEAL - 2

....,,._, _ ,

g.

,.I,

'-''-'....I.

_,,.j . .\.,

Did the DistTict Court err it1 finding that the N'F.A had standing to bring a

petition for smnrnary judgment?

h.

Did the Disuict Court err in finding that the foll performance of rhe

voluntary addendum contracts did not render the matter moor?
L

Did the District Court err in finding that the Yolu11tary addcndLUn corl':racts

were vc,id as a matter oflaw for failure to comply with Idaho Code Section 33-513?

j.

Did the District Court err in finding thm the volunt:::ry addendum contracts

were ineffective at altering the tenns of continuing salaries (continuing contrac1 salaries)
and, therefore, were ,oid'?

k.

Did the District Court en in fhding that Nampa, ir. requesting teachers tc

volunteer furlough days, was "negotiating'' ,.vi.th indiv1dual teache.rs

,;,J1d

s1teh action \Vas

precluded by ~tatute?

l.

Did the District Court err in finding the vobntary adder.du:n ..:cmrncts to be

illegal for faibre to comply with Idaho Code Section 33-127:, cl seq.?
111.

Did the District Court err in finding that the Superintend.::nt of Nampa was

deemed to have knowledge that individual teachers. had no authority tv wlunteer furk,u1..J1
days for the be11efit of Nampa?
n.

Did lhe Di:;trict Court ~rr in finding that individual teachers had nc, aalhority

to vol or.teer furlough days, and, therefore, the Yoluntary addendum contracts were void as a

matter of law?
o.

Did the D1!;trict Court err in dismissing Appellant':.:: \1ction fl_ir Sununary

Judgn1e11t?

AMENDED NOTCCE OF APPEAL 3

4.

Appellant requests the reporter's standard transcript from the hearing on Appellant's

Motion for Stunntflry Judgment and Respondent\ cross-Motion for Surnmary Judgment held on

August 1, 2013.
5.

Appellant rrquest._;; the following documents to b,~ included in the Clerk's record, in

addition to those automatically indudu1 under Idaho Appellate Rule 28:
a.

Appellant':; l\fotion for Sununary Judgrnern and Memo:andmu

u1 Support of

Moticn for Summary Judgment;
b.

Affidavit of Steve Kipp in Support of Appellan~' s Mc1tion for Summary

Judf;ment;
c.

Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment anJ \1ernorandurn in Support

of \101ion for Summ,:rry JJJgrnem;
d.

Affidavit of Mandy Simpson m Support of Respondent's Motion for

Summary Judgmern:;
e.

Appelhmt's Reply Memorandum to Respondent's fl.foiion for Summary

Judgment;
f.

Respondent's Memorandrnn in Opposition to Appellan:'s Morion tor

Summary Judgment;
g

Appellant's Repiy to Respondent's Menwrandum m Opposition to

Appdlrnt's Motion for Sunu11a1y Judgment;
h.

Respondent's Reply Memorandrnn in Support of Re$Th)ndent's Motion for

Surnmary Judgment.

6.

Ne, order has been entered sealing all or any p·Jrtkm of the rncc<rd.

7.

I\o additional charts

appeal.

A:t,.1ENDED 1'~0T!CE OF APPEAL - 4

0r

pictures offered or adn'Ll.ttcd as exhibits are requested in this

8.

It is certified:

a.

That a copy of this Amended Notice of Appeal ha.;, b:::t:n ~erved on the

c011rt

repo1ter, Laura Vlhiti.ng, at the following addrtsss:
Laura \Vr...iting, Court Reporter
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany Street
Caldweli, ID 83605

b.

lbat the Clerk

\)f

t.1-i.e District Court hct.<, been paid the esrimated foe of

$2~HJ.D(J D:!r prc::paratiou of the reporter's transcript, subject to adjustments or 1eceipt fiom

the C!er!::'s office of an estimate t.1f cost;
c.

That the esti.rnukd fee for the preparafo.:,11 of the Clerk's rte:ord irr th? amount

of $100.0(• has been paid subject ~o adjustment or receipt 1rc•m the Uerk's oftfo: of an
estimate of rosl;

d

"That the appellate filing foe of$109.00 has been paid;

c.

That service ha.--i been made upon all pc'Lrties requirec to be s~rved pursuant to

Idaho AppellHte Rule 20.
p;.
DATED this --·- dav.,. of November, 2013.

I

YOST LAW, PLLC

By:

/J---

---

---

Chip Gile:-:i
Auomeys for Resp,)ndenH\ppellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
;

).._

I hereby certify that on this __j._:__ day of Kovember1 2013, I caused to be served by the
method indicated below a true aud correct eopy of the foregoing d()cmnent upon:

IPaw}. Stark

·---·---i--u-.-S.-h-1aIT_________

i Idaho Education Association
i 620 North 6 01 St
l PO Box 2638

l Boise, ID

83701

h=aura .Whiti~;g,CourtR-ep;;?ter

anyon County. Counhouse
I:C.1115
Albany Street
.I Caldwell.. 1D 83605

,Overnight Mail
/ -:-_Hand Delivery
\ X Facsimile No. 344-1606
1 ___

1
1

-7:Is. M-~-ai-1____

'.
Overnight Mail
· ::·-Hand Delivery
X Facsimile No. 454~ 7525
'--·

L---·-·----------------~·-·"-------------· ..--.---...

--------------Chip Gile:;
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I

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN1Y OF CANYON

NAMPA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,
Petitioner-Respondent,
-vsNAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 131,
Respondent-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-13-02962*C
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBIT

I, CHRIS YAM.A.MOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the following
is being sent as an exhibit:

NONE
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this _ _ _ day of December, 2013.

CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District
Court of the Third Judicial
District of the State of Idaho,
u.vy_....,,,. the County of Canyon.
By:
Deputy

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBIT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

NAMPA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,
Petitioner-Respondent,
-vsNAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 131,
Respondent-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-13-02962*C
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK

I, CHRISYAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the above and
foregoing Record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my
direction as, and is a true, correct Record of the pleadings and documents under Rule 28
of the Idaho Appellate Rules and as requested in the Amended Notice of Appeal.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this _ _ _ day of December, 2013.

CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District
Court of the Third Judicial
District of the State of Idaho,
the County of Canyon.
By:
Deputy

CERTIFICATE OF CLERK

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

NAMPA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,
Petitioner-Respondent,
-vsNAMPA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 131,
Respondent-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court No. 41454-2013
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, CHRIS YAM..t\MOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or had delivered by United State's Mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the
Clerk's Record and one copy of the Reporter's Transcript to the attorney of record to each
party as follows:

William F. Yost and Chip Giles, YOST LAW, PLLC.
Paul J. Stark, Idaho Education Association

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this _~_r:__ day of December, 2013.

CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District
Court of the Third Judicial
District of the State of Idaho,
~ .... ~·r-v~ the County of Canyon.
By:
Deputy
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

